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ARTICLE

Prosecuting Foreign States
CHIMÈNE I. KEITNER*
In recent years, the Department of Justice has shown increased interest in prosecuting
entities associated with foreign states for activities including cybercrime, economic espionage,
and sanctions violations. It has also sought third-party evidence from foreign state-owned
entities in connection with high-profile criminal investigations, including the Mueller
investigation. These actions raise fundamental questions about the immunities of foreign
states and state-owned entities from U.S. criminal proceedings. This Article provides the
first comprehensive analysis of—and answer to—these basic questions. In doing so, it
upends the widespread but misleading perception that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA) provides the sole basis for exercising jurisdiction over foreign states
in every context. The better view is that the FSIA neither authorizes nor prohibits
criminal proceedings. Until Congress enacts appropriate legislation, claims to immunity
from such proceedings will remain a matter of common law.
The common law of foreign state immunity from criminal proceedings warrants
legislative attention. First, Congress can and should make explicit that the FSIA only
governs civil proceedings. Second, it should clarify that state-owned enterprises are not
entitled to blanket immunity from criminal proceedings simply because they are majorityowned by foreign states. Misapplying the FSIA’s expansive definition of “foreign state”
to preclude criminal proceedings can impede the effective investigation and prosecution of
foreign corporations whose activities would otherwise be subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and
that international law does not necessarily view as entitled to immunity. The default
position should be that foreign state-owned companies are subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of U.S. courts, at least with respect to their commercial activities.

* Alfred & Hanna Fromm Professor of International and Comparative Law, University of
California Hastings College of the Law. My thanks for insights and feedback to colleagues including
Kevin Benish, Kristina Daugirdas, William Dodge, Jean Galbraith, Maggie Gardner, Monica Hakimi,
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to participants in the 2019 ASIL International Law in Domestic Courts Workshop and the 2021
Temple University International Law Colloquium. Emilie Jones, Lindsey Berger, and Noa Elazar
provided valuable research assistance, and UC Hastings Law librarian Vincent Moyer was an invaluable
partner in obtaining elusive documents. Any errors are, of course, my own.
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INTRODUCTION

On February 16, 2018, a grand jury in the District of Columbia returned
an indictment against three Russian companies for a scheme to interfere in
the U.S. political system.1 The defendants included the Internet Research
Agency LLC, a Russian organization that Special Counsel Robert Mueller
described as being “engaged in operations to interfere with elections and
political processes.”2 Investigators determined that the companies were
“tools of the Russian state, acting at the direction of the Kremlin.”3 In
September 2018, four state-owned Chinese companies were arraigned on an
indictment charging each of them with “conspiring to commit economic
espionage and related crimes.”4 Although the companies’ precise
relationship to the People’s Republic of China remains murky, the
companies have argued that they are immune from prosecution because
they are “instrumentalities” of a foreign state.5 The Chinese companies’
argument echoes that raised by Halkbank, a Turkish state-owned bank
charged in 2019 with offenses related to the bank’s participation in a
“multibillion-dollar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran.”6 The
Department of Justice had previously charged nine individual defendants,
including “bank employees, the former Turkish Minister of the Economy,
and other participants in the scheme.”7 At the time of writing, the district
court for the Southern District of New York had denied Halkbank’s claim

1. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three
Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United States Political System (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/y2awjhsd.
2. Indictment at 2, United States v. Internet Rsch. Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032 (D.D.C. Feb. 16,
2018).
3. Katie Benner & Sharon LaFraniere, Justice Dept. Moves to Drop Charges Against Russian Firms Filed
by Mueller, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/voxvp87 (reporting that prosecutors decided
to drop charges against two defendant shell companies, Concord Management and Concord
Consulting, because “they were exploiting the case to gain access to delicate information that Russia
could weaponized”).
4. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Four Chinese State-Owned Industrial Companies Arraigned
in Economic Espionage Conspiracy (Sept. 7, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y72cv39b.
5. The Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments on this issue on October 15, 2020. See Oral Argument,
United States v. Pangang Grp. Co., No. 19-10306 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2020),
https://tinyurl.com/y5mctrfm.
6. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Turkish Bank Charged in Manhattan Federal Court for Its
Participation in a Multibillion-Dollar Iranian Sanctions Evasion Scheme (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/yy6pjq8g.
7. Id. One defendant pled guilty in 2017; a second defendant was convicted in a jury trial, while
the other individual defendants “are fugitives.” Id.; see also United States v. Atilla, 966 F.3d 118, 121-22
(2d Cir. 2020) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal).
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to immunity, and the Second Circuit had agreed to expedite Halkbank’s
interlocutory appeal of that decision.8
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity has a long historical
pedigree.9 In 1812, Chief Justice John Marshall famously invoked this
principle to find the Schooner Exchange, a French ship of war, immune from
judicial process while it was in a Philadelphia port.10 Two centuries later,
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s opinion for the Supreme Court in Rubin v. Republic
of Iran held that the Persepolis Collection of ancient clay tablets from Iran
was immune from attachment and execution while on loan to the University
of Chicago.11 As these cases show, jurisdictional immunities can prevent
U.S. state and federal courts from adjudicating disputes they would
otherwise have authority to resolve, and from issuing legal process they
would otherwise be competent to compel. Yet while foreign sovereign
immunity constitutes a bedrock doctrine for defining the scope of domestic
jurisdiction, its contours remain surprisingly contested and even
misunderstood.
Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)
to separate the exercise of domestic civil jurisdiction from the conduct of
diplomacy.12 The State Department, which had been making case-by-case
immunity determinations in the preceding decades, urged the Act’s passage
“to provide objective standards to be interpreted by the courts” on whether
to recognize a foreign state’s claim of immunity.13 The FSIA codified the

8. United States v. Halkbank, No. 20-3499 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2020) (granting motion to stay
proceedings in the district court and indicating that the appeal will be heard on an expedited basis);
United States v. Halkbank, No. 15 Cr. 867, 2020 WL 5849512 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020) (denying motion
to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity, extraterritoriality, and lack of personal jurisdiction).
On October 29, 2020, The New York Times reported that Turkish President Recep Erdogan had
repeatedly pressed President Donald Trump to quash the investigation, and that Attorney General
William Barr advocated a settlement under which the bank would pay a fine and acknowledge “some
wrongdoing” if the Justice Department agreed “to end investigations and criminal cases involving
Turkish and bank officials who were allied with Mr. Erdogan and suspected of participating in the
sanctions-busting scheme.” Eric Lipton & Benjamin Weiser, Turkish Bank Case Showed Erdogan’s Influence
with Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/y2rffbbn. On December 23, 2020, the
Second Circuit granted appellants’ request for a stay and directed the clerk to set an expedited schedule
for the appeal. In re Turkiye Halk Bankasi, A.S., No. 20-3008 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2020), ECF No. 51.
9. For additional historical background, see Chimène I. Keitner, Between Law and Diplomacy: The
Conundrum of Common-Law Immunity, 54 GA. L. REV. 217 (2019) (chronicling nineteenth and early
twentieth-century practice); Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign Official Immunity, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 704 (2012) (chronicling late eighteenth-century practice).
10. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
11. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018).
12. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 16021611.
13. Barry E. Carter, Immunity for Foreign Officials: Possibly Too Much and Confusing as Well, 99 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. P ROC. 230, 233 (2005).
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so-called “restrictive” theory of immunity.14 Instead of providing foreign
states with absolute immunity from the exercise of domestic jurisdiction, the
restrictive theory allows one state to exercise jurisdiction over another state’s
private or commercial activities, but not its public acts.15 The FSIA also
extends this rule to suits against foreign state-owned enterprises.16
As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the FSIA was adopted “to
assure litigants that decisions regarding claims against states and their
enterprises ‘are made on purely legal grounds.’”17 Yet, the FSIA itself has
become politicized in recent years, most recently by congressional proposals
to strip China of sovereign immunity from civil suits for failing to contain
the novel coronavirus.18 Meanwhile, defendants and third-party witnesses in
criminal proceedings have argued that the FSIA prevents the United States
from exercising criminal jurisdiction over foreign states and state-owned
entities under any circumstances.19 If they are correct, then this would
significantly curtail U.S. prosecutorial authority over conduct by foreign
companies that violates U.S. law.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court are in a position to resolve these
ambiguities, but neither has done so to date. In early 2019, the Court
declined to weigh in on a dispute between U.S. prosecutors and an
anonymous foreign state-owned company that arose out of Special Counsel
Robert Mueller’s investigation of potential links between the Russian
government and the 2016 Trump campaign.20 The drama and speculation
surrounding the dispute reached a fever pitch when an entire floor of the
D.C. Circuit courthouse was sealed off for oral arguments about a subpoena
issued to the company by a grand jury.21 The crux of the legal dispute was
whether the United States can exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state14. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 363 (1993); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,
504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992).
15. See id.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
17. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 323 (2010) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976),
as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606).
18. See also Civil Justice for Victims of COVID Act, S. 4212, 116th Cong. (2020). See generally The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Coronavirus, and Addressing China’s Culpability: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Chimène Keitner, Alfred and Hanna Fromm Professor
of International Law, UC Hastings Law San Francisco), https://tinyurl.com/y5gph9sx.
19. See, e.g., Chimène Keitner, Deciphering the Mystery Subpoena Case: Corporate Claims to Foreign
Sovereign Immunity from U.S. Criminal Proceedings, JUSTSECURITY (Dec. 31, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/yamuy7ut (describing legal issues in this case); Ingrid Wuerth, The Mystery Grand
Jury Case and Criminal Prosecutions of State-Owned Enterprises, LAWFARE (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/y4rs26u3 (noting that criminal prosecutions of foreign-state-owned enterprises is
“a topic of growing significance”).
20. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 139 S. Ct. 1378 (2019) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
21. Katelyn Polantz et al., Mystery Mueller Mayhem at a Washington Court, CNN (Dec. 15, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/ya9qgp32.
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owned company by compelling compliance with a grand jury subpoena.22
Meanwhile, recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the FSIA have
involved potential immunity from post-judgment discovery,23 the
commercial activity exception to immunity,24 pleading standards for
expropriation claims,25 immunity from attachment of property,26 procedures
for serving process on foreign states,27 and the proper application of the
state sponsors of terrorism exception, which allows claims for punitive
damages.28 The flow of cases on related questions shows no sign of
abating.29
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of—and answer
to—questions about foreign state immunity from criminal jurisdiction in
U.S. courts.30 In doing so, it upends the widespread but misleading
perception that the FSIA provides the sole basis for exercising jurisdiction
over foreign states in every context.31 The better view of current law is that
the FSIA neither authorizes nor prohibits criminal proceedings. Absent
further legislation, claims to immunity from such proceedings will remain a
matter of common law rooted in historical practice and judicial decisions,
informed by Congress’s statutory choices in the civil context.32 Although
foreign states themselves are not generally subject to prosecution in
domestic courts, there is no categorical bar to criminal proceedings against
foreign state-owned enterprises in either domestic or international law.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part II sets out the basic tenets of
foreign sovereign immunity. It then describes Congress’s enactment of the
22. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 912 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
23. Republic of Argentina v. NML Cap., Ltd., 573 U.S. 134 (2014).
24. OBB Personenverkehr v. Sachs, 577 U.S. 27 (2015).
25. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312
(2017).
26. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816 (2018).
27. Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048 (2019).
28. Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601 (2020).
29. E.g., Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, No. 19-351 (Feb. 3, 2021) (involving the FSIA’s
expropriation exception).
30. There appears to be only one previous sustained scholarly analysis of criminal proceedings
and the FSIA. See John Balzano, Crimes and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: New Perspectives on an Old
Debate, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REGUL. 43 (2012).
31. There is at least one statutory provision outside the FSIA that denies immunity to foreign
states in certain circumstances: § 106 of the bankruptcy code, as amended in 1994. See Tuli v. Republic
of Iraq, 172 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1999). The FSIA is thus not quite as comprehensive as has often been
assumed.
32. Cf. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (finding that the common law and other
specialized statutes, not the FSIA, govern claims to foreign official immunity in U.S. courts unless the
foreign state is the real party in interest); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620-21 (1983) (describing federal common law in that case as “necessarily informed
both by international law principles and by articulated congressional policies”); Ingrid Wuerth, The
Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations, 106 GEO. L.J. 1825, 1850 (2018) (noting that
“contemporary federal common law, especially that governing immunity, allows courts to give effect
to very closely related statutory frameworks”).
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FSIA, and notes some additional issues raised by criminal proceedings
against foreign companies. Part III turns to the treatment of foreign stateowned enterprises in U.S. law. It then explores how concepts of corporate
liability and state responsibility translate in the domestic criminal context.
Part IV canvasses prior U.S. judicial analyses of foreign sovereign immunity
from criminal proceedings against the backdrop provided in Parts II and III.
Part V sketches a framework for approaching basic unresolved questions
relating to criminal jurisdiction over foreign states and provides
recommendations to Congress.
First and foremost, Congress can and should make explicit that the
FSIA only governs civil proceedings. Second, it should clarify that foreign
state-owned enterprises are not entitled to blanket immunity from criminal
proceedings simply because they are majority-owned by foreign states.
Misapplying the FSIA’s expansive definition of “foreign state” to preclude
criminal proceedings can impede the effective investigation and prosecution
of foreign corporations whose activities would otherwise be subject to U.S.
jurisdiction, and that international law does not necessarily view as entitled
to immunity. The default position should be that foreign state-owned
companies are subject to the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts, at least with
respect to their commercial activities.

II.

FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY AND U.S. LAW

An analysis of foreign sovereign immunity under U.S. law begins, but
does not end, with the FSIA. This Part explores the background
assumptions that informed Congress’s codification of aspects of foreign
sovereign immunity in the FSIA. As the Supreme Court observed in
Samantar v. Yousuf, the enacting Congress was responding to a “particular
problem”—namely, inconsistency and political pressure associated with
case-by-case immunity determinations by the State Department.33 This led
Congress to establish what the Court has characterized as “a comprehensive
solution for suits against [foreign] states.”34 Some have seized upon the fact
that the FSIA’s text “does not explicitly limit its grant of immunity to civil
cases”35 to argue that it also shields foreign states and state-owned entities
from criminal jurisdiction. However, to date, “no reported court decision
has dismissed an indictment or otherwise suppressed a criminal prosecution
based on immunity conferred by the FSIA.”36

33. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 323.
34. Id.
35. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
451 reporters’ note 4 (AM. L. INST. 2018) [hereinafter FOURTH RESTATEMENT].
36. Id.
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Part II.A traces the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity under U.S.
law. Part II.B examines the codification of foreign state immunity in the
FSIA. Part II.C highlights contexts in which foreign corporations might find
themselves subject to the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. This
background sets the stage for an analysis of claims to jurisdictional immunity
from criminal proceedings by foreign state-owned entities.

A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Before the FSIA
The modern state system is based on the idea that each nation-state
exercises plenary jurisdiction over its own territory and has equal sovereign
status in the international system.37 As a practical matter, the conduct of
international relations typically necessitates interaction among states and
their agents. The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity facilitates this
interaction by shielding foreign states and their agents from the exercise of
domestic jurisdiction. As Lady Hazel Fox and Professor Philippa Webb
emphasize, the law of state immunity enables states “to carry out their public
functions effectively.”38 These prudential restraints on the exercise of states’
domestic jurisdiction have crystallized into rules of international law.39
Although foreign sovereign immunity is rooted in international law, as
Fox and Webb note, the domestic law of the forum state “determines the
precise extent and manner of application” of these rules.40 Notably, as they
explain, “modern international law does not require the courts of one State
to refrain from deciding a case merely because a foreign State is an unwilling
defendant.”41 Rather, the circumstances of each case will determine whether
or not the exercise of jurisdiction is permitted by domestic law and
consistent with international law.
A plea of foreign state immunity does not absolve a defendant from
legal responsibility for wrongdoing, but it can create obstacles to seeking a
remedy. As presently understood, foreign state immunity operates as a
jurisdictional defense, not a defense on the merits.42 Immunity doctrines
37. See, e.g., Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 34 (1978).
38. HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 1 (rev. 3d ed. 2013).
39. Id. at 13. U.S. courts have been outliers in characterizing foreign sovereign immunity as a
matter of “comity.” The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283, 353 (1822), discussed in INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 40 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011);
see also Chimène I. Keitner, Germany v. Italy and the Limits of Horizontal Enforcement: Some Reflections from
a United States Perspective, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 167, 173 (2013) (comparing the International Court of
Justice’s approach to state immunity with the U.S. approach).
40. FOX & WEBB, supra note 38.
41. Id.
42. As a procedural matter, adverse immunity determinations are generally subject to interlocutory
appeal in U.S. courts. See Carlos M. Vázquez, Altmann v. Austria and the Retroactivity of the Foreign Sovereign
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proscribe coercive proceedings against certain categories of foreign
defendants in certain types of disputes. By preventing a domestic court from
reaching the merits of a dispute, this prohibition—like other procedural
hurdles—can effectively deprive the claimant of a remedy, unless there is an
alternate means of seeking redress, such as diplomacy or international
adjudication.43
The remedial gap created by immunity doctrines has both practical and
conceptual justifications. At a basic level, one state’s exercise (or purported
exercise) of jurisdiction over another runs counter to the foundational idea
that states are sovereign equals.44 Subjecting a foreign country to the forum’s
parochial procedures can create legitimacy deficits when the defendant
challenges the neutrality of the forum country’s courts. It can also prove
highly impractical, especially if the foreign country is recalcitrant. As a result,
domestic courts have not traditionally been the forum of choice for
transnational dispute resolution. Rather, states tend to view dispute
resolution between sovereign entities as a matter for diplomacy or consentbased international adjudication.
International dispute resolution thus remains predominantly state-tostate, whether in the form of diplomatic negotiations or consent-based
adjudication or arbitration.45 The absolute theory of foreign state immunity
operates as a forum selection doctrine by precluding domestic adjudication
of claims against foreign states, absent a waiver of immunity. The constraints
imposed by the absolute theory become problematic, however, when a state
seeks to enter the marketplace and engage in transnational commerce. In
conceptual terms, it becomes more difficult for states to argue that they
should be treated differently from private enterprises when they are engaged
in substantively similar activities. In practical terms, the limited capacity of
diplomacy and international adjudication to address the full range of issues
raised by the increased transnational movement of goods and people creates
Immunities Act, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 207, 213 (2005) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of
immunity under the FSIA as “a present protection from the burdens of suit”).
43. See, e.g., Lorna McGregor, Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty, 18
EUR. J. INT’L L. 903 (2007).
44. See von Mehren, supra note 37, at 35; see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.:
Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶ 57 (Feb. 3) (indicating that the rule of state immunity
“derives from the principle of sovereign equality of States” and that “[t]his principle has to be viewed
together with the principle that each State possesses sovereignty over its own territory”).
45. This is so, even though an increasing number of international tribunals and human rights
bodies have become open to direct petitions from individuals and other non-state actors. See, e.g.,
Francisco Orrego Vicuña, Individuals and Non-State Entities Before International Courts and Tribunals, 5 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 53, 59 (2001) (“Increasingly the possibility for the individual to claim in his own
right has been recognized and diplomatic protection is acquiring a residual role rather than the principal
one it had in the past.”). This is certainly the case with the rise of investor-state arbitration, which is
grounded in state consent, and which enables aggrieved investors to bring certain claims directly. See
id.
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demands for additional avenues of recourse for aggrieved parties. These
demands put pressure on a system of absolute immunity, while at the same
time creating more occasions for foreign states to invoke immunity as a
defense to the exercise of domestic jurisdiction.
In contrast to the absolute theory, the restrictive theory of foreign
sovereign immunity permits one state to exercise jurisdiction over another
state with respect to the defendant’s commercial activities. The restrictive
theory gained traction in the early decades of the twentieth century,
particularly in disputes involving a foreign state’s agencies or
instrumentalities, rather than the foreign state itself.46 Professor David
Bederman recounts:
The rule in United States courts, as elsewhere in the period from
1920 to 1952, was that agencies or instrumentalities of foreign
sovereigns that were engaged in commercial activities, were
amenable to suit for causes of action arising in connection to those
activities. Indeed, a number of cases from that period held that to
the extent that agencies or instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns
were separately constituted legal entities, they were not covered by
foreign sovereign immunity protections at all.47
In other words, the United States has long rejected the idea of absolute
immunity, especially for separate legal entities.48
Other countries have also embraced the restrictive theory. As Lord
Denning observed in a foundational 1977 opinion for the U.K. Court of
Appeals, “[i]n the last 50 years there has been a complete transformation in
the functions of a sovereign state. Nearly every country now engages in
commercial activities.”49 The restrictive theory “gives immunity to acts of a
governmental nature, described in Latin as jure imperii, but no immunity to
acts of a commercial nature, jure gestionis.”50 As Lord Shaw explained in the
same case, “[s]o long as sovereign institutions confined themselves to what
may in general terms be described as the basic functions of government[,] a
total personal or individual immunity from suit was unobjectionable since
the area in which it operated had its own inherent limits.”51 However, he
continued, to “apply a universal doctrine of sovereign immunity” to a state’s
46. See Aff. of David J. Bederman ¶ 11, Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de per Francais,
No. 01-9442, 2001 WL 34764368 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2001).
47. Id.
48. See also infra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
49. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356, 366 (UK) (speech of
Lord Denning).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 385 (speech of Lord Shaw).
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commercial activities “is more likely to disserve than to conserve the comity
of nations on the preservation of which the doctrine is founded.”52
During the second half of the twentieth century, the contours of the
restrictive theory took shape as a matter of international law.53 Customary
international law is formed by near-uniform state practice accompanied by
a sense of legal obligation that international lawyers call opinio juris.54 In a
process typical of customary international law formation, new
understandings of immunity at the international level became embedded in
domestic legal practice, and vice versa.
The United States was an early proponent of the restrictive theory. The
State Department formally announced its adoption of the theory in a nowfamous 1952 letter from Acting State Department Legal Adviser Jack Tate
to Acting Attorney General Philip Perlman.55 Shortly thereafter, William
Bishop wrote in the American Journal of International Law that “one could
hardly maintain that customary international law today requires that
immunity be granted” when a foreign government “engages in
commerce.”56 Customary international law continues to reflect the
restrictive theory.57
The Tate Letter announced the official U.S. adoption of the restrictive
theory, but it did not offer “specific guidelines or criteria for differentiating
between a sovereign’s private and public acts.”58 U.S. courts therefore
looked to the State Department to apply the restrictive theory in particular
disputes. As a practical matter, this meant that a foreign state’s first action
upon being served with process in litigation was typically to petition the
52. Id. at 386.
53. For a study of the global trend towards adopting the restrictive theory and its implications for
customary international law, see Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, How Does Customary International
Law Change? The Case of State Immunity, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 209 (2015).
54. DAVID J. BEDERMAN & CHIMÈNE I. KEITNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 18
(4th ed. 2015).
55. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Att’y
Gen., Dep’t of Just. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 984, 984-85 (1952).
56. William W. Bishop, Jr., New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L.
93, 95 (1953). In 1976, State Department Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh testified that although “the
Soviet Union and other such countries will normally—if they think they can put it across—assert a
sovereign immunity, the fact is that [even] they realize that the restrictive theory is the international law
principle that is applied in the countries in which they trade.” Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against
Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. L. and Governmental Rels. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 56 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department
of State).
57. The process of negotiating the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities
of States and their Property also reinforced and clarified certain widely shared understandings about
the scope and operation of the restrictive theory, even though the treaty has not yet entered into force.
G.A. Res. 59/38, annex, United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property (Dec. 2, 2004) (not yet in force).
58. von Mehren, supra note 37, at 41.
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State Department to assert immunity on its behalf. The Department
developed an internal administrative procedure to handle such requests.59 In
the period between the Tate Letter and the enactment of the FSIA, U.S.
courts generally deferred to the outcome of this State Department process.
In the absence of a State Department determination, they endeavored—or
at least purported—to apply the standards developed by the Department, to
the extent these could be discerned.60
The Supreme Court had endorsed the practice of deferring to the State
Department’s views on a foreign state’s immunity from civil suit in the
decade preceding the Tate Letter, in two World-War-II era cases that
involved seizures of foreign ships.61 This posture of judicial deference
resulted in increased pressure on the State Department by foreign states
seeking immunity in U.S. courts.62 The intensity of this pressure, coupled
with the need to provide greater stability and predictability to litigants, led
the Department to urge Congress to codify the restrictive theory of foreign
sovereign immunity, as the next section describes.

59. Id. (indicating that the Department “allowed the parties to a litigation in which the issue of
sovereign immunity was presented to attend an informal hearing at the Department with an
opportunity for oral argument and the submission of briefs”); see also J. Roderick Heller, Litigation of
Sovereign Immunity Questions, 70 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 42, 46 (1976) (noting the process allowed in
litigation involving sovereign immunity questions). A similar, although less formal, process has
emerged when a current or former foreign official asks the State Department to provide a suggestion
of immunity. See Remarks from the Panel: Sovereign Immunity Revisited: Immunity of States and Their Officials for
Atrocities or Terrorist Acts, 113 A M. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 279 (2019) (remarks of former State
Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger).
60. At least one careful student of judicial opinions from this period expressed deep skepticism
about whether this is what courts were actually doing, writing that: “[a]ccording to judicial theory, the
State Department was supposed to prescribe the national standards against which claims were judged,
but in practice each Circuit had a body of law which differed in detail from the State Department’s
prescriptions and which might be applied in the absence of a definitive State Department
determination.” Frederic Alan Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and
Effect, 3 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1976); see also id. at 9 (citing Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman for the proposition
that “courts must apply State Department prescriptions in resolving claims to immunity even in the
absence of State Department action on a particular claim”); id. at 16 (observing that “[t]he restrictive
theory applied by the courts, however, was not always identical to the one applied by the Department”).
61. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (deferring to Executive Branch
determination); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945) (indicating in dicta that courts
would follow Executive Branch determinations); see also Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China,
348 U.S. 356, 360 (1955) (indicating that the State Department’s “failure or refusal to suggest such
immunity has been accorded significant weight by this Court”).
62. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 60, at 117 n.282 (quoting Immunities of Foreign States: Hearing on H.R.
3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims & Governmental Rels. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 34
(1973) (testimony by Secretary of State William Rogers and Attorney General Richard Kleindienst that
codifying foreign sovereign immunity would “free the Department from pressures by foreign states to
suggest immunity” and put the Department “in a position to assert that the question of immunity is
entirely one for the courts”)).
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B. Codifying the Restrictive Theory in Civil Disputes
Congress enacted the FSIA to facilitate, and to circumscribe, the
exercise of civil jurisdiction over foreign states. Congressman Hamilton
Fish, Jr., who was a member of the House Judiciary Committee in 1976,
recounted that the FSIA was viewed “[f]irst and foremost . . . as a Federal
long-arm statute allowing both the Federal and State courts to assume in
personam jurisdiction over foreign entities for nongovernmental actions.”63
He explained that “[t]he intent was to depoliticize commercial and routine
legal disputes involving foreign states” because “[s]imply put, when a nation
chooses to enter the marketplace, it should be placed on the same footing
as any other party with respect to legal rights and liabilities.”64
The FSIA applies to suits filed in both state and federal courts.65
Congress intended it to “provide the sole basis upon which foreign states
(and their agencies and instrumentalities) may be sued.”66 If an exception to
immunity applies, the FSIA “functions as a federal long-arm statute” that
brings the foreign state within the personal jurisdiction of a U.S. court,
assuming proper service of process.67 Proper service plus an applicable
exception also confers subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts.68
The FSIA’s basic structure is straightforward, even though its provisions
are codified in different sections of the U.S. Code. As Dame Rosalyn
Higgins emphasized, from an international law perspective, sovereign
immunity “is a derogation from the normal rule of territorial sovereignty. It
is sovereign immunity which is the exception to jurisdiction and not
jurisdiction which is the exception to the basic rule of immunity.”69 The
FSIA turns this analytic framework on its head by creating a presumption
of foreign state immunity from domestic civil jurisdiction. Congress codified
this provision in Title 28, Part IV of the U.S. Code, which contains rules
governing jurisdiction and venue. Section 1604 of Title 28 provides that “a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
63. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearing on H.R. 1149, H.R. 1689, and H.R. 1888 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. L. & Governmental Rels. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 2 (1987)
[hereinafter FSIA Hearing].
64. Id.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) provides for the removal of a civil action against a foreign state from state
court to federal court for a non-jury trial.
66. FOURTH RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, pt. IV, ch. 5, intro. note (emphasis added) (internal
citation omitted). But cf. supra note 31 (indicating that 11 U.S.C. § 106 abrogates the sovereign immunity
of “a governmental unit” in bankruptcy proceedings, and that 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) defines “a
governmental unit” to include a foreign state or “other foreign or domestic government”).
67. FOURTH RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, pt. IV, ch. 5, intro. note.
68. Id.
69. Rosalyn Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. INT’L L. REV.
265, 271 (1982).
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United States and of the States except as provided” in the FSIA.70 Despite
this sweeping language, the structure of the FSIA supports the view that it
does not create—but also does not preclude—criminal jurisdiction over
foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities.
The absence of the word “civil” before the word “jurisdiction” in
section 1604 has prompted some parties to argue that the FSIA precludes
any exercise of jurisdiction over foreign states by U.S. courts unless it falls
within an explicitly enumerated exception.71 The absence of this
qualification has not been explained.72 The most likely explanation is that,
because Congress was legislating to address issues raised by cross-border
commercial disputes, it was simply not thinking about criminal proceedings
one way or the other.73 The same is true of bankruptcy proceedings, which
the Ninth Circuit has held are not precluded by the FSIA despite section
1604’s seemingly comprehensive language.74
The core exceptions to the FSIA’s grant of jurisdictional immunity are
codified in section 1605. The section provides that “[a] foreign state shall
not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case” that satisfies certain enumerated criteria.75 Consistent
with Congress’s intent to codify the restrictive theory, these criteria include
“any case in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state.”76 A foreign state also shall not be
immune if the action is based “upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere,” or,
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (emphasis added).
71. See infra Parts IV.A & IV.B.
72. Some other countries enacted statutes governing foreign sovereign immunity that explicitly
exclude criminal proceedings, reinforcing the idea that the codification movement in the 1970s and
1980s focused on civil proceedings against foreign states and their instrumentalities. See, e.g., State
Immunity Act 1978, c. 33, § 16(4) (UK); State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-18, s 18 (Can.); cf. G.A.
Res. 59/38, at 2 (Dec. 2, 2004) (noting the “general understanding” that the U.N. Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States “does not cover criminal proceedings”).
73. A compilation of all State Department determinations of immunity in the two and a half
decades between the Tate Letter and the FSIA contained only one reference to a criminal proceeding,
which involved a subpoena duces tecum. JOHN A. BOYD, Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of
State—May 1952 to January 1977, in DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT’L L. 1017, 1038 (Michael Sandler et al. eds.,
1977) [hereinafter Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State]; see also infra note 154 and
accompanying text (reporting the denial of immunity on the basis that the Philippine National Lines
engaged in commercial activities); cf. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 323 (2010) (finding foreign
official immunity outside the scope of the FSIA in part because “[t]he immunity of officials simply was
not the particular problem to which Congress was responding when it enacted the FSIA”).
74. See supra note 31 (indicating that 11 U.S.C. § 106 abrogates the sovereign immunity of “a
governmental unit” in bankruptcy proceedings, and that 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) defines “a governmental
unit” to include a foreign state or “other foreign or domestic government”); Tuli v. Republic of Iraq,
172 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that foreign states can no longer assert sovereign immunity
from liability for certain actions under the Bankruptcy Code).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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finally, “upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes
a direct effect in the United States.”77
The FSIA defines “commercial activity” to mean “either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act.”78 The nature of the act, not its purpose, determines its commercial
character.79 The FSIA requires two elements in order for the commercial
activities exception to provide U.S. courts with civil jurisdiction over a
foreign state: an action “based upon” a commercial activity (or an act in
connection with a commercial activity) of the foreign state, plus a nexus
between the act and U.S. territory. It thus combines the permissive features
of the restrictive theory (allowing U.S. courts to exercise subject-matter
jurisdiction over a foreign state’s commercial activities) with a nexus
requirement that codifies limits on the territorial reach of personal
jurisdiction.
As noted above, the language of the FSIA sounds in civil, rather than
criminal, procedure. Under the statutory framework created by the FSIA, 28
U.S.C. § 1330(a) gives the federal district courts original subject-matter
jurisdiction over any nonjury action against a foreign state where a statutory
exception to immunity applies.80 Section 1330(b) creates personal
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign “as to every claim for relief over which
the district courts have [original] jurisdiction” if the defendant has been
properly served.81 In this respect, the FSIA offers civil claimants one-stop
shopping for both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction.82 The House
Report accompanying the FSIA described § 1330(b) as providing “in effect,
77. Id. Other exceptions include waiver, commercial activities with a sufficient nexus to the United
States, expropriation in violation of international law, and certain tortious acts by a foreign state’s
officials or employees while in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. More recent exceptions cover
certain acts by designated state sponsors of terrorism, and certain tortious acts in connection with an
act of international terrorism on U.S. soil. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605A, 1605B.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
79. Id. As the Supreme Court explained in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, “the issue is whether
the particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of
actions by which a private party engages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce.’” 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992);
see also DAVID P. STEWART, THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT : A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 51
(2d ed. 2018) (highlighting the focus on the nature of the conduct as opposed to its purpose); FOURTH
RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 454 (commenting on immunity from claims arising from commercial
activity).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
82. Mary Kay Kane observed in 1982 that lingering questions about “whether section 1330 was
intended to be the exclusive source of jurisdiction for cases brought under the Act” revealed “the
confusion that arises from the blend of substantive and procedural criteria in the Act.” Mary Kay Kane,
Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 392 (1982). In her view, “[e]ven if
Congress intended to specify the exclusive procedures to be used in suits against foreign governments,
section 1330 need not provide the sole basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
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a Federal long-arm statute over foreign states” that embodies “[t]he
requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice.”83
These requirements have been understood as applying in the context of civil,
but not necessarily criminal, proceedings.
In 1983, the Supreme Court described the FSIA as providing “a
comprehensive set of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every
civil action against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities.”84 David Stewart has noted that “[t]he reference to ‘civil
actions’ [in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria] does not suggest,
however, that states or their agencies or instrumentalities can be subject to
criminal proceedings in U.S. courts [under the FSIA]; nothing in the text or
legislative history [of the FSIA] supports such a conclusion.”85 To be sure,
as indicated above, section 1330 provides subject-matter jurisdiction over
“any nonjury civil action.”86 However, it is a separate question whether a
different provision of the U.S. Code provides criminal jurisdiction over
foreign states or state-owned entities, just as 11 U.S.C. § 106 does in the
bankruptcy context.87 We would expect to find the answer to that question
in Title 18, which deals with crimes and criminal procedure, rather than in
Title 28.
The Supreme Court’s frequently-cited statement in a 1989 opinion that
“the text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress’ intention that
the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in
our courts” also does not resolve the question of criminal jurisdiction.88 In
that case, Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., the Court
considered whether to interpret the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. §
1350, as providing an additional basis for exercising jurisdiction over civil

83. von Mehren, supra note 37, at 46 n.60 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 13-14 (1976), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606). Although state courts generally apply the FSIA’s exceptions
to determine whether they have subject-matter jurisdiction over civil claims against foreign states, they
appear to rely on minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Interlotto, Inc. v. Nat’l
Lottery Admin., 689 A.2d 148, 151 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (indicating that “because personal
jurisdiction is not automatically delegated to state courts, defendants here must be subject to the
jurisdictional prerequisites of New Jersey”).
84. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (emphasis added).
85. DAVID P. STEWART, THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES A CT: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES
1 n.2 (2d ed. 2018)); cf. Country A’s Reply Brief Supporting Its Petition for A Writ of Certiorari at 8, In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 139 S. Ct. 1378 (2019) (No. 18-948), 2019 WL 1014181, at *8 (inaccurately
citing this footnote as an “expla[nation]” by the Federal Judicial Center “that foreign agencies and
instrumentalities enjoy absolute immunity from American criminal proceedings”). The guide, which is
published by the FJC but does not represent an official position of that organization, does not answer
the question of immunity from criminal jurisdiction.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
87. See supra note 31.
88. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
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actions against foreign states.89 The Court cited Verlinden for the proposition
that Congress intended the FSIA to provide the “sole basis” for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in a court in the United States, meaning that
the ATS did not provide an alternative basis for bringing civil suit.90 The
Court did not consider or make any findings about whether a different
provision in the U.S. Code could provide courts with jurisdiction over
criminal or other types of proceedings against a foreign state, which were
not at issue in that case.
The Supreme Court’s statements in both Verlinden and Amerada Hess
attribute a particular intent to Congress when it enacted the FSIA—namely,
“(1) to endorse and codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and
(2) to transfer primary responsibility for deciding ‘claims of foreign states to
immunity’ from the State Department to the courts.”91 The Court has not
relied solely on the words of the FSIA, but rather has interpreted those
words in the light of Congress’s intent. It is difficult to imagine that the
enacting Congress silently intended to prevent U.S. law enforcement from
seeking to compel foreign state-owned enterprises to produce information
in connection with criminal investigations, or to prevent prosecutors from
bringing criminal charges, without explicitly debating and codifying this
choice. It is even more difficult to imagine that Congress would have
deprived U.S. courts of jurisdiction over criminal proceedings initiated by
governmental authorities while opening those same courts to civil litigation
initiated by private parties in commercial disputes.
Subsequent Congressional hearings support this understanding of
Congress’s intent, which should continue to guide judicial interpretation of
the statute. In 1987, Congress held hearings on proposals to amend the
FSIA to, among other things, facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards.92
There was also public pressure on Congress to allow injured parties to bring
private lawsuits to challenge foreign states’ conduct, even if no existing FSIA
exception applied. The State Department’s consistent position was that
private lawsuits against a foreign state should not be allowed for that state’s
governmental acts. Deputy State Department Legal Adviser Elizabeth
89. Id.
90. Id. In its most recent decision interpreting the FSIA, the Supreme Court considered the
statute’s “text, context, and history” to discern and effectuate Congress’s intent. Federal Republic of
Germany v. Philipp, supra note 29, at *9.
91. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010); see also id. at 313 n.7 (citing 28 U.S.C. §1602).
(“The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states to
immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect
the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts. Under international law, states are
not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned
. . . .”).
92. FSIA Hearing, supra note 63, at 2. See generally Mark B. Feldman, Amending the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: The ABA Position, 20 INT’L LAW. 1289 (1986).
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Verville testified that, as a general matter, “wrongful state action, even
within the territory of another state, is a problem that states deal with on the
plane of international relations and public law, including criminal prosecution in
appropriate cases, rather than through private domestic legal remedies against
foreign states.”93 Under the prevailing view, the FSIA did not affect the U.S.
government’s ability to pursue diplomatic or criminal measures for
international crimes.
When the Department of Justice initiates criminal proceedings, courts
generally assume (correctly or not) that the Executive Branch has
determined the defendant is not entitled to immunity, and that the
proceedings are consistent with U.S. foreign relations interests.94 The FSIA
was not intended to affect the government’s ability to pursue criminal
proceedings. The statute simply does not address the exercise of
prosecutorial authority or how the restrictive theory applies in the context
of criminal proceedings, which serve a different function than private civil
actions. One should not read a blanket prohibition on criminal proceedings,
including against foreign state-owned enterprises, into this statutory silence.
The context of the 1987 proceedings, which followed years of private
litigation against Chile that failed to yield a judicial remedy, underscores this
point. At the time of Ms. Verville’s testimony, the United States was engaged
in ongoing (and, according to some, inadequate) diplomatic efforts to secure
accountability and compensation for the 1976 assassination of exiled
Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier and researcher Ronni Moffitt in a car
bombing in Washington, DC.95 A grand jury had indicted three Chilean
military officers working for the Chilean intelligence service, but Chile
refused to extradite them for trial.96 The victims’ family members sought
93. FSIA Hearing, supra note 63, at 18-19 (emphasis added). Although Ms. Verville likely had in
mind criminal prosecution of individuals, she nevertheless distinguished this remedy from “private
domestic” civil actions.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (opining that “by
pursuing Noriega’s capture and this prosecution, the Executive Branch has manifested its clear
sentiment that Noriega should be denied head-of-state immunity”). But cf. MICHAEL P. S CHARF &
PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS 94 (2010) (observation by former
Acting State Department Legal Adviser Michael Matheson that “the process of indictments in the U.S.
system is not well integrated with foreign policy concerns”). For an example of potential foreign policy
conflicts created by prosecutorial decisions, see Thomas W. Lippman & Lynne Duke, U.S. Refusal to
Drop Case Against S. African Firm Causes Friction, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 1996),
https://tinyurl.com/y53487ho. See generally United States v. Armaments of S. Afr., Ltd., No. 91-602
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 1991); Litigation Release No. 13077, 1991 SEC LEXIS 2521 (Nov. 5, 1991).
95. See Taylor Branch, The Letelier Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1978, at SM7 (detailing
investigation of the murder plot).
96. See Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Sec’y for Legis. & Intergovernmental Affs., to Dan
Glickman, Chairman, Admin. L. & Governmental Rels. Subcomm., Comm. of the Judiciary, House of
Representatives (June 30, 1996), Doc. No. 4, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT 55 (1988).
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other avenues of redress, including by filing a civil lawsuit against Chile in
U.S. court under the FSIA’s exception for certain torts on U.S. territory.97
The court ultimately entered damages judgments against Chile and several
individual defendants.98 When the plaintiffs sought to execute upon assets
belonging to Chile’s national airline to satisfy the judgment, however, the
FSIA’s provisions on immunity from execution proved an insurmountable
obstacle.99 That the FSIA deals separately with immunity from execution
also underscores Congress’s understanding that the exercise of different
types of jurisdiction warrants differently tailored immunity regimes.
Although the criminal prosecution in the Letelier case involved charges
brought against natural persons, criminal proceedings in U.S. courts can also
reach legal persons.100 Prosecutions of foreign corporations have become
more common in the past two decades.101 While specialized statues afford
jurisdictional immunity to certain categories of natural persons who act on
behalf of foreign states (such as foreign diplomats), other jurisdictional
immunities (such as foreign head of state immunity and foreign official
immunity) have not yet been codified.102 This does not mean that no such
immunities exist, but it does mean that they currently lack a statutory basis.
The same is true of criminal jurisdiction over foreign states and state-owned
enterprises. The next section explores how state-owned enterprises could
97. de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D.D.C. 1980).
98. de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259, 266-67 (D.D.C. 1980).
99. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the airline’s assets could not properly be
treated as belonging to Chile itself or executed upon under the relevant provisions. de Letelier v.
Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984). In the end, progress toward a degree of individual
criminal accountability for some perpetrators and civil compensation for the families only came after
the fall of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet’s regime. See Sarah Anderson, Over 40 Years, Measures of
Justice, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. (Sept. 15, 2016), https://ips-dc.org/40-years-measures-justice/; see also
Dispute concerning responsibility for the deaths of Letelier and Moffitt (U.S./Chile), 25 R.I.A.A. 1, 11
(1992) (determining, pursuant to a bilateral agreement, “the final amount of compensation to be paid
by the State of Chile”).
100. See infra Part II.C.
101. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775 (2011)
(identifying and analyzing this trend).
102. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 254d (providing that “[a]ny action or proceeding brought against an
individual who is entitled to immunity with respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . or under any other laws extending diplomatic privileges and
immunities, shall be dismissed”). Presumably, the Executive Branch would not initiate criminal
proceedings against a person or entity that it believed was entitled to jurisdictional immunity. It remains
an open question whether this means that, as a matter of U.S. law, the Executive Branch could
prosecute a sitting foreign head of state, even though this would violate customary international law.
See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, 24 (Feb. 14)
(describing customary international law). See generally Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After
Samantar, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 837, 843 (2011) (examining foreign official immunity
determinations following the Supreme Court’s Samantar decision). For contrasting views on Executive
Branch authority over immunity determinations, compare Ingrid B. Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity
Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011), with Lewis
S. Yelin, Head-of-State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 911 (2011).
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become subject to criminal investigation or even prosecution, thereby
raising potential questions of immunity.

C. Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Entities
Although we tend to think of criminal proceedings as intended to
constrain natural persons, legal persons can also be implicated in criminal
investigations and even prosecutions, especially in the United States.103
Indeed, the United States has earned a reputation as “a magnet for
organizational prosecutions.”104 This phenomenon post-dated the FSIA’s
enactment, so it is perhaps not surprising that Congress did not have
criminal jurisdiction in mind when it codified the restrictive theory.
Among other criminal statutes, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) can be, and has been, enforced against foreign companies.105 This
statute was enacted in 1977 in the wake of the Watergate scandal, and
Congress extended its reach to encompass foreign firms in 1998.106 Current
or formerly state-owned firms have been implicated in FCPA actions. In
2006, for example, the Norwegian state-owned company Statoil (now
renamed Equinor) agreed to pay a $10.5 million penalty and to enter into a
deferred prosecution agreement for bribing an Iranian official.107 In 2011,
formerly state-owned companies Magyar Telekom and Deutsche Telekom
paid almost $64 million in criminal penalties for FCPA violations.108 In
2018, the Brazilian state-owned company Petrobras agreed to pay over $850
million in criminal penalties and to enter into a non-prosecution agreement
for FCPA violations in conjunction with its role in facilitating payments to
politicians and political parties in Brazil.109
103. See generally V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV .
L. REV. 1477 (1996). For an early proposal on how to think about U.S. jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, see David James Homsey, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: The Application of a
Minimum Contacts Theory, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 429 (1980).
104. Garrett, supra note 101, at 1788.
105. See Michael S. Diamant et al., FCPA Enforcement Against U.S. and Non-U.S. Companies, 8 MICH.
BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 353, 355 (2019).
106. Garrett, supra note 101, at 1829-30.
107. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company That Bribed
Iranian Official (Oct. 13, 2006), https://tinyurl.com/yyymya6r. Interestingly, DOJ did not mention at
the time that the company was state-owned. See Kara Brockmeyer et al., The Year 2018 in Review:
Continued Globalization of Anti-Corruption Enforcement, FCPA U PDATE (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP), Jan.
2019, at 1, 7 n.9, https://tinyurl.com/yytzgam4.
108. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Magyar Telekom and Deutsche Telekom Resolve Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay Nearly $64 Million in Combined Criminal
Penalties (Dec. 29, 2011), https://tinyurl.com/y2keyy7n. For other examples of FCPA prosecutions,
see PIERRE-HUGUES VERDIER, GLOBAL BANKS ON TRIAL: U.S. PROSECUTIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (2020).
109. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Petróleo Brasiliero S.A.—Petrobras Agrees to Pay More
Than $850 Million for FCPA Violations (Sept. 27, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/yausotxz. This was
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There are a variety of contexts in which a foreign bank or other
corporation might find itself on the receiving end of criminal process in a
U.S. court. The question of immunity does not arise unless the court would
otherwise be able to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign entity. In
determining whether there is jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in the
criminal context, some courts have looked to the effects of the corporation’s
activities in the United States, as well as contacts between the corporation
or its agents and the United States.110 It is not clear that such an analysis is
necessary. For example, the Southern District of New York recently
reaffirmed its prior ruling in a case involving a state-owned bank that “[i]t is
axiomatic that where, as here, a District Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction over the criminal offenses charged, it also has personal
jurisdiction over the individuals charged in the indictment.”111
The role of due process in a jurisdictional analysis involving a foreign
state or its agencies or instrumentalities also remains unclear in the civil
context under the FSIA. In a 2007 amicus brief in a case involving the status
of a wholly-owned subsidiary of a foreign government agency, the United
States explained that the FSIA made foreign state agencies and
instrumentalities “subject to suit for their commercial activities” while
according them “certain procedural protections.”112 The Supreme Court has
assumed without deciding that foreign states could be “persons” entitled to
due process protections under the Fifth Amendment;113 either way, in the
reportedly the first time the United States “charged a state-owned entity for effectively taking bribes
and thereby misstating its financial statements.” Brockmeyer et al., supra note 107, at 7. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) also reached a settlement with the company for the same conduct,
while pursuing charges against another Brazilian state-owned company on the same theory. See id.
110. See United States v. Chitron Elecs. Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 298, 30 (D. Mass. 2009) (indicating
that “[t]he case law discussing the specific issue of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in
the criminal context is surprisingly sparse and poorly developed”). On the question of relationships
among corporate entities and their jurisdictional significance, compare Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen
Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF.
L. REV. 1 (1986), with Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1023 (2004). For an analysis of the apparent contradiction between jurisdictional narrowing in the
civil context and increased prosecutorial activities targeting foreign banks, see Pierre-Hugues Verdier,
The New Financial Extraterritoriality, 87 GEO. WASH. L. R EV. 239 (2019).
111. United States v. Halkbank, No. 15 Cr. 867, 2020 WL 5849512, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020);
see also United States v. Halkbank, 426 F. Supp. 3d 23, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[I]t is improper to make a
personal jurisdiction motion based upon the absence of minimum U.S. contacts in a criminal case”
because “minimum contacts challenges . . . do not apply to criminal matters.”). The district court found
that United States v. Chitron Elecs. Co. was an “outlier” and should not be followed. Id. at 38.
112. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, Powerex Corp. v.
Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. 551 U.S. 224 (2007) (No. 05-85), 2007 WL 697887.
113. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (suggesting in a citation
that, if foreign states are analogous to sovereign states of the U.S. federal union, they would not qualify
as “persons” for due process purposes). The D.C. Circuit has held that foreign states themselves are
not “persons” entitled to due process protections under the Fifth Amendment. Price v. Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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civil context, it is likely that the FSIA’s service provisions and nexus
requirements satisfy whatever standard applies.114
A foreign state-owned enterprise (SOE) likely enjoys due process
protections in civil proceedings, unless it is deemed to be an agent of the
foreign state.115 However, as indicated above, due process standards in the
civil context do not necessarily translate directly into the criminal context.116
Whatever the precise standard for personal jurisdiction, the court’s exercise
of that jurisdiction must comport with applicable understandings of
procedural due process, and there must be federal subject-matter
jurisdiction if the proceedings are in federal court.117
Federal criminal subject-matter jurisdiction rests on 18 U.S.C. § 3231,
which provides district courts with original jurisdiction “of all offenses
against the laws of the United States,”118 without regard to the identity or
status of the defendant. In 2016, the Judicial Conference amended Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 4 to facilitate service on foreign corporations.119
114. See I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 351 F.3d 1184, 1191 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (indicating that, if an action satisfies the requirements of the FSIA, courts need not examine
whether there are “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum); cf. Ingrid Wuerth, The
Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2019) (arguing
that it makes little sense to “afford litigation-related constitutional protections to foreign corporations”
but to “deny categorically such protections to foreign states”). For an analysis of due process
requirements under the Fifth Amendment, see Chimène I. Keitner, Personal Jurisdiction and Fifth
Amendment Due Process Revisited, in THE RESTATEMENT AND BEYOND: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (Paul B. Stephan & Sarah A. Cleveland eds., 2020).
115. See, e.g., Frontera Res. Azer. Co. v. State Oil Co., 582 F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that a foreign company does not enjoy due process protections if it is an agent of a foreign state); TMR
Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (relying on circuit
precedent that “it is not to the due process clause but to international law and to the comity among
nations, as codified in part by the FSIA, that a foreign state must look for protection in the American
legal system”); id. at 301 (invoking the so-called Bancec presumption of separate juridical status for a
foreign state’s instrumentality, subject to a showing that there is a principal-agent relationship between
the two).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 826 F.3d 152, 156 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v.
Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 552 (4th Cir. 2012)) (indicating that there must be “a sufficient nexus between
the defendant and the United States” so that applying the statute “would not be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair”).
117. See STEWART, supra note 85, at 21 n.56. A practitioners’ note for attorneys representing
corporate criminal defendants notes that “the criminal rules do not provide a perfect avenue for
moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction” because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
12(b)(2) has been interpreted as allowing motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Instead, the note advises that clients rely on Rule 12(b)(1) and have counsel enter a special appearance
to challenge jurisdiction. Because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4 now allows service of a
summons on foreign corporations through “any means that gives notice,” the note recommends
arguing that “the minimum-contacts test from the civil context should apply.” C. Kevin Marshall &
Andrew J. Bentz, Personal Jurisdiction: A New Battlefront in Corporate Criminal Cases, JONES DAY INSIGHTS
(Aug. 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y2up8dqs.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
119. See Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Crim. Rules, to Hon.
Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., Jud. Conf. of the United States 3
(May 6, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/y3ma63pv. In addition, the Patriot Act conferred authority on the
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The terms of that amendment extend to “organization[s] not within a
judicial district of the United States,” including SOEs.120 The Rules
Committee explicitly indicated, with respect to service on state-owned
enterprises, that “the Department of Justice provided written assurance [to
the Committee] that it had consulted with appropriate authorities in the
Executive Branch about the potential international relations ramifications
of the proposed amendment.”121 As for potential constitutional due process
objections to amended Rule 4, the Committee stated that “[i]t is always
assumed that a rule will be interpreted against the backdrop of existing rules,
statutes, and constitutional doctrine.”122 This caveat would presumably
include applicable jurisdictional immunities, whether based in statute or on
federal common law.
Questions about the reach of U.S. jurisdiction over foreign companies
have also arisen in the context of subpoenas. For example, in the Marc Rich
& Co. case, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdiction to
order compliance with a grand jury subpoena and to impose monetary
sanctions to compel compliance by a Swiss company.123 Marc Rich & Co.
was a Swiss commodities trading corporation that did not maintain an office
in the United States. However, its wholly owned subsidiary did business in
New York. The Second Circuit held that the company was subject to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction to compel production of business records
as part of a federal grand jury’s investigation of an alleged tax evasion
scheme.124 The court acknowledged that the exercise of jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation based on injurious effects in the United States requires
“caution in matters which have international complications.”125 Despite that
caveat, the court opined that “it may well be that the occurrence of the
offense itself is sufficient to support a claim of jurisdiction, provided
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard has been given.”126 If
Attorney General or the Treasury Secretary to issue a summons or subpoena to “any foreign bank that
maintains a correspondent account in the United States” as part of anti-money-laundering
investigations and prosecutions. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(k) (2014). For a recent analysis and application
of these provisions, see In re Sealed Case, 932 F.3d 915 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
120. See Raggi, supra note 119, at 5 (rejecting opposition to the amendment from a law firm
representing a Chinese state-owned company on the grounds that “[t]he amendment is intended to
allow reliable service with adequate notice on these organizations so that U.S. courts can adjudicate the
merits of criminal allegations and ensure appropriate accountability”).
121. Id. at 6.
122. Id.
123. In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983).
124. Id. The court also found that Swiss law prohibiting production of the records was not a bar
to the production order.
125. Id. at 667.
126. Id. at 667-68. See generally S. Cass Weiland, Congress and the Transnational Crime Problem, 20 INT’ L
LAW. 1025 (1986) (“[T]here are definite limits to the continual extensions of U.S. criminal law and
policy and Congress is probably already reaching those limits.”).
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personal jurisdiction exists, a subpoena can compel the witness to produce
all documents in the witness’s custody and control, even if those documents
are located outside of the United States.127
Increased prosecutorial attention to activities including cyber espionage
and trade secret theft, in addition to foreign corrupt practices, could set
criminal investigations of foreign entities on a collision course with potential
claims of jurisdictional immunity.128 There are indications that the
Department of Justice does not view the fact that a natural person is a
former state official or acted on behalf of a foreign state as shielding that
person from criminal proceedings.129 For example, in the corruption
context, the Department of Justice has indicted Mexico’s former Secretary
of Public Security for cocaine trafficking and making false statements, and
“former” (according to the U.S.) president of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro
and other senior Venezuelan officials for corruption, narco-terrorism, and
other charges.130 The Department has also been active in indicting foreign
individuals and entities for hacking and other computer-related crime,
including when those individuals or entities are associated with, or even

127. The Department of Justice has come to refer to the Marc Rich type of subpoena as a “Bank
of Nova Scotia” subpoena based on an Eleventh Circuit case with a similar fact pattern. See Anthony
J. Caggiano, Case Note, International Law – Grand Jury Proceedings – Comity of Nations Fails to Justify a
Showing of Relevance Prior to Enforcement of Grand Jury Subpoena, Grand Jury Proceedings v. Bank of Nova
Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 565 (1983). For a discussion of
contemporaneous cases and their implications, see Roger M. Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal
Investigations, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 999 (1984).
128. For student notes examining U.S. government responses to traditional and cyber economic
espionage, respectively, see Darren S. Tucker, The Federal Government’s War on Economic Espionage, 18 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 1109 (1997) and Genna Promnick, Cyber Economic Espionage: Corporate Theft and the New
Patriot Act, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 89 (2017). See generally NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE &
SEC. CTR., FOREIGN ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN CYBERSPACE (2018), https://tinyurl.com/y7xeptua
(describing the threat foreign economic espionage poses to the United States); CHARLES DOYLE,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42681, STEALING TRADE SECRETS AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: A N
OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT (2016) (describing how the Trade Secrets Act could
undermine claims of jurisdictional immunity).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding prosecution of defendant for torture committed
under color of Liberian law).
130. Press Release, U.S. Att’y Office, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former Mexican Secretary of Public
Security Arrested for Drug-Trafficking Conspiracy and Making False Statements (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/sjhr7g4; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Nicolás Maduro Moros and 14 Current
and Former Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and
Other Criminal Charges (Mar. 26, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/vpwley2. On avenues of accountability
for human rights abuses by the Maduro regime, see Gissou Nia & Rodrigo Diamanti, How to Hold
Venezuela’s Maduro Accountable for Human Rights Abuses, JUSTSECURITY (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://tinyurl.com/y2sre3us. More recently, the United States reversed its decision to prosecute a
former Mexican defense minister on drug trafficking charges in response to diplomatic pressure from
Mexico. See Alan Feuer & Natalie Kitroeff, Mexico, Outraged at Arrest of Ex-Official, Threatened to Toss U.S.
Agents, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/y38z79bx.
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controlled by, a foreign government.131 By and large, the U.S. government
has endeavored to characterize the proscribed actions as non-sovereign in
nature, perhaps to avoid confronting or eroding norms of foreign sovereign
immunity.132
This needle is becoming ever-more difficult to thread. Notably,
indictments of foreign actors for conducting “information warfare against
the United States” are not susceptible to a commercial characterization.133
This observation cautions against importing the FSIA’s immunity
provisions wholesale into the criminal context without further consideration
of the special circumstances of SOEs (and natural persons) whose actions
can violate legal obligations, and warrant appropriate penalties, separate
from the foreign state itself.
The next Part explores the relationships among concepts of corporate
criminal liability, state responsibility, and foreign state immunity. Part IV
discusses recent cases that have grappled with the doctrinal implications of
these relationships. Part V identifies certain steps Congress could take to
address persistent ambiguities.

III.

CORPORATE LIABILITY IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Jurisdictional immunities mediate the relationship between the
international and domestic legal orders—the first premised on sovereign
equality and non-intervention, and the second premised on plenary
territorial jurisdiction and control. Arguments in U.S. courts about the
131. See generally Chimène I. Keitner, Attribution by Indictment, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 207
(2019) (detailing U.S. indictment of foreign state actors for malicious cyber activity).
132. See, e.g., Paul Rosenzweig, More Thoughts on the DOJ China Indictment, LAWFARE (May 20, 2014),
https://tinyurl.com/y6n292m4 (observing that “the United States is doubling down on the economic
espionage distinction that it seeks to draw between national security level snooping and spying for
corporate gain”); David E. Sanger, With Spy Charges, U.S. Draws a Line That Few Others Recognize, N.Y.
TIMES (May 19, 2014), https://tinyurl.com/yypgu3g9 (noting the U.S. argument that “there is a major
difference between spying for national security purposes, something the United States does daily, and
the commercial, for-profit espionage carried out by China’s military”). Russell Buchan’s important
book on cyber espionage looks at the substantive legal rules governing state activity but does not
consider questions of foreign sovereign immunity. RUSSELL BUCHAN, CYBER ESPIONAGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-23 (2019) (distinguishing between “political cyber espionage” and
“economic cyber espionage”).
133. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and
Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United States Political System (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/y2awjhsd. For this reason, the Russian Federation was deemed immune from suit
for such activities under the FSIA. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Russian Federation, 392 F. Supp.
3d 410, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding that “the Russian Federation cannot be sued in the courts of the
United States for governmental actions, subject to certain limited exceptions not present in this case,
just as the United States government generally cannot be sued in courts abroad for its actions,” and
observing that “[t]he remedies for hostile actions by foreign governments are state actions, including
sanctions imposed by the executive and legislative branches of government”).
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contours of sovereign immunity generally privilege relevant domestic law,
but they are also sites of international legal contestation. Authoritative
interpreters translate international legal concepts into domestic doctrine,
and then re-encode domestic practice as an element of customary
international law.134
As discussed in Part II.B, the purpose of the FSIA was to put foreign
states and SOEs on the same footing as private parties with respect to their
commercial activities.135 The same logic that drove the codification of the
restrictive theory in the civil context counsels against absolute immunity for
SOEs in the criminal context. This Part takes a closer look at Congress’s
decision to include SOEs within the definition of “foreign state” in the
FSIA, and the relationship between domestic ideas of corporate criminal
liability and the international law concept of state responsibility.

A. The Domestic Legal Treatment of Foreign State-Owned Enterprises
Before delving further into arguments about the relationship between
the FSIA and criminal proceedings, it is worth asking what would entitle a
corporate entity to claim sovereign immunity in the first place. The answer
as a matter of statutory law is the FSIA’s definition of “foreign state,” which
includes “a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state.”136 An agency or instrumentality, in turn,
means “a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise” that is either an
“organ” of a foreign state, or an entity, the majority of whose “shares or
other ownership interest” are owned directly by a foreign state.137 The FSIA
does not treat foreign states exactly the same as agencies and
instrumentalities for all purposes, but it accords certain jurisdictional
immunities to both.138
The FSIA’s relatively broad definition of “foreign state” could be
explained, at least in part, by Congress’s desire in 1976 to enact a multipurpose statute that would fix problems relating to federal long-arm
jurisdiction, as well as codify civil immunity.139 The Restatement (Fourth) of
U.S. Foreign Relations Law notes that “[t]he FSIA provides a broader
134. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
138. For differences regarding service, see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)-(b). On additional issues that can
arise in determining the legal status and proper treatment of SOEs, see infra Part III.A.
139. As for the question of “whether a particular territorial, political, or regional body is a foreign
state under the FSIA, courts consider whether it has been formally recognized by the United States, as
well as the criteria of statehood from international law.” FOURTH RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 452
reporters’ note 1. To date, courts have not identified direct conflicts between these two factors. Id.
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definition of ‘foreign state’ than is typical under foreign and international
practice, by including agencies and instrumentalities for most purposes.”140
This expansive definition does not necessarily preclude civil proceedings,
since SOEs engaged in commercial activities will not enjoy immunity for
those activities if there is a sufficient connection to the United States. Its
primary effect is to force courts to engage in an immunity analysis when the
defendant is a SOE. A defendant that does not fall within the definition of
“foreign state” cannot invoke immunity from civil proceedings under the
FSIA, although natural persons can assert immunity under other statutes or
federal common law.
In her 1987 testimony, Deputy State Department Legal Adviser Verville
indicated that, in the Department’s view, it would be appropriate to place
state-owned commercial enterprises “on the same footing as their privatelyowned counterparts regarding torts and other conduct” for which they
might be subject to suit.141 Ms. Verville registered “doubt that the stateowned purely commercial enterprise is considered part of the state for
sovereign immunity purposes by the international community generally,”142
meaning that a narrower definition of “foreign state” in the FSIA would not
conflict with settled expectations under international law. However, she
recognized that reasons for leaving such entities “in the act” might include
“purposes such as service of process and federal court jurisdiction, given the
foreign relations interests these cases can have.”143 The down-side, as
subsequent cases have shown, is that the FSIA’s expansive definition of
“foreign state” can embolden foreign state-affiliated entities to claim
immunity and create delays in unforeseen contexts, such as third-party
subpoenas for financial records and other documents.144
The problem of asserting different types of domestic jurisdiction over
foreign SOEs is not a new one. For example, in 1927, the Attorney General
brought an antitrust suit against the Société Commerciale des Potasses
d’Alsace, an “organization created and controlled by the Republic of
France.”145 The State Department indicated that “it has long been the view
140. FOURTH RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 452 reporters’ note 12. Under the approach taken
by the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, “[p]rovided it is proved that the act performed
was . . . an act in exercise of sovereign authority and not coming within any of the exceptions to State
immunity, the entity performing it, whatever the nature and degree of its connection with the State,
may benefit from immunity.” FOX & WEBB, supra note 38, at 353.
141. FSIA Hearing, supra note 63, at 26 (statement of Elizabeth G. Verville, Deputy Legal Adviser,
Department of State).
142. Id.; see also id. (“Even absolute immunity states generally agree that state-owned purely
commercial entities may be sued abroad and establish them with the ability to sue and be sued
generally.”).
143. Id. at 26-27.
144. See infra Parts IV.A & IV.B.
145. United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
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of the Department of State that agencies of foreign governments engaged
in ordinary commercial transactions in the United States enjoy no privileges
or immunities not appertaining to other foreign corporations, agencies, or
individuals doing business here, and that they should conform to the laws
of this country governing such transactions.”146 France argued that the
Société Commerciale and its agents were entitled to immunity “because they
are engaged in performing what the Republic of France considers a
governmental function,”147 even if it was commercial in nature. The district
court rejected this argument in an early application of the restrictive theory
in an enforcement proceeding.148
Another pre-FSIA case further illustrates this point. In 1952, the AngloIranian Oil Company, Ltd. moved to quash a subpoena duces tecum served on
the company in conjunction with an investigation of a possible violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.149 In response to a request from the district court
for its views, the Department of State transmitted a note from Anthony
Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which invoked “a
claim of sovereignty.”150 The Department neither endorsed nor rejected this
claim. The district court observed that “[w]here the political branch of the
[U.S.] government declines to assert an opinion as to the status of a foreign
sovereign, involved in a legal proceeding, the courts may decide for
themselves whether all the requisites of immunity exist.”151 It went on to
determine that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was “indistinguishable from
the [g]overnment of Great Britain,”152 and that the company was therefore
immune from a subpoena relating to “a fundamental government function
serving a public purpose.”153
In 1960, the State Department declined to suggest immunity for a
Philippine state-owned company.154 The Philippine National Lines, which
was owned and operated by the government of the Republic of the
Philippines, had received a subpoena duces tecum to appear before a grand
146. Id.
147. Id. at 201.
148. Id. at 203. The court also noted that “[t]he suit was brought by the Attorney General,” and
that “[t]hese facts indicate that the Executive Department of the government also is of the opinion
that this suit is not a suit against the Republic of France, or any representative of that republic.” Id.
149. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
150. Eden’s note also approved and certified the authenticity of a prior communication from
Great Britain’s Minister of Fuel and Power that had directed the company “not to produce any
documents which were not in the United States of America and which do not relate to business in the
United States” without prior governmental authorization. Id. at 289.
151. Id. at 290 (citing Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945)).
152. Id. at 291.
153. Id. at 290; see also id. at 291 (observing that “[t]o cite a foreign sovereign into an American
Court for any complaint against him in his public capacity is contrary to the law of nations”).
154. Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, supra note 73, at 1038.
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jury “with certain documents relating to shipping freight and other shipping
practices.”155 The Department declined to suggest immunity on the grounds
that the Philippine National Lines was engaged in commercial activities.156
The court observed that this case fell “somewhere in between” the Société
Commerciale case and the Anglo-Iranian Oil case, and reserved
enforcement of the subpoena pending a showing that the company’s
activities were “substantially, if not entirely, commercial” and that the
subpoenaed records were necessary to further a criminal investigation of
others, or that the company had “join[ed] with others to violate federal
laws.”157
In a 1975 amicus brief regarding liabilities arising from Cuba’s
nationalization of cigar companies, the Department of Justice characterized
Supreme Court cases as “long recogniz[ing] that a commercial enterprise
owned or controlled by a sovereign is not immune from suit on a cause of
action arising out of its business dealings.”158 It observed that “[t]his rule
also has long been applied to the separate commercial enterprises owned or
controlled by foreign states.”159 Against this backdrop, it is difficult to
imagine that the State and Justice Departments in proposing the FSIA, and
Congress in passing it, would have deprived the Department of Justice of
the ability to investigate and potentially prosecute SOEs without so much
as a word on the matter.160
By enacting the FSIA, Congress created a federal long-arm statute for
foreign states and SOEs and placed authority to apply the restrictive theory
in the hands of the judicial branch. However, this statutory regime did not
address other related issues, such as the rules governing criminal
proceedings involving these entities. A convergence of factors now requires
addressing this gap.

155. Id.
156. Id. at 1039. No other State Department decisions in this compilation appear to contain the
words “subpoena,” “prosecution,” or “criminal.”
157. In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298, 319-20 (D.D.C.
1960).
158. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (No. 73-1288), 1975 WL 173732, at *18.
159. Id.
160. Cf. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR
CORPORATIONS 37 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that the “Act and its legislative history do not say a single
word about possible criminal proceedings under the statute”).
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B. Corporate Criminal Liability and State Responsibility
A corporation, like a state, acts through natural persons.161 Corporations
are “legally deemed to be single entities, distinct and separate from all the
individuals who comprise them.”162 Although standards for imputing an
agent’s acts to the corporation can vary among jurisdictions,163 the basic idea
that individuals’ actions can be imputed to the corporation for purposes of
liability cuts across these differences.164
Attribution questions regarding SOEs can involve an additional layer.
Although domestic law generally governs the activities of corporations
(including foreign corporations) without regard to the identity of their
shareholders, certain international conduct-regulating rules apply only to
state, rather than private, actors.165 Moreover, international law rules of
attribution have evolved to determine when and whether a natural or legal
person’s conduct is attributable to a state for purposes of state
responsibility—the international law analogue of liability.166 Questions can
thus arise about whether a particular corporation should be treated as a
161. See Celia Wells, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 147 (Stephen Tully ed., 2005) (“Legal personality means that corporations can
sue and be sued, hold property and transact, and incur criminal liability in their own name and on their
own account”). The fact that an act is attributable to a corporation or to a state does not, in itself,
absolve individuals from personal responsibility for tortious or criminal acts. See CHARLES DOYLE,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43293, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAW
5 (2013) (“With rare exception, statutes which expose a corporation to criminal liability do not absolve
the officers, employees, or agents whose violations are responsible for the corporation’s plight.”).
Stefan Lo has called the idea that the corporate entity bears sole legal responsibility for all misconduct
by directors the “dis-attribution fallacy.” Stefan H. C. Lo, Dis-Attribution Fallacy and Directors’ Tort
Liabilities, 30 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 215, 216 (2016) (identifying “serious problems of accountability if
directors can, through the corporate vehicle, effectively engage in tortious conduct without bearing any
responsibility under the law”).
162. Wells, supra note 161, at 147.
163. See id. at 150 (describing three legal theories for attributing blame to corporations).
164. See Guy Stessens, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective, 43 INT’L & COMPAR.
L.Q. 493, 519 (1994) (observing that “[e]ven the jurisdictions that do not accept the concept of
corporate criminal liability as such have come to realize this and try to target the corporation by
introducing ersatz models of corporate liability”). But cf. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:
A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 519 (2001) (noting that “[t]he relations among parts
of a business enterprise can make the determination of the boundaries of that entity difficult”).
165. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (1995) (“[C]ertain forms of conduct violate the
law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private
individuals.”). Hence the much-studied footnote 20 of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, in which the court noted that “[a] related consideration is whether international law extends
the scope of liability for violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a
private actor such as a corporation or individual.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20
(2004); see also Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 72
(2008) (interpreting this footnote as asking “whether a private actor, as opposed to a state actor, can
violate international law, not with whether a corporation, as opposed to an individual, can do so”).
166. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at
35 (2001).
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state-owned enterprise for various purposes,167 as well as whether that
corporation’s activities are attributable to a foreign state.168 The question
whether corporations themselves can be held criminally liable also arises in
international law, although it generally falls to domestic law to provide an
answer.169
The international legal responsibility of foreign states is largely sui generis,
but it has generally not been conceptualized as criminal in nature.170 This is
so, even though international arbitral decisions have occasionally awarded
punitive damages against states.171 Nor has international law generally
envisioned foreign states themselves as subject to criminal sanction.172
However, individuals who act on behalf of foreign states, and entities

167. See, e.g., Minwoo Kim, Regulating the Visible Hands: Development of Rules on State-Owned Enterprises
in Trade Agreements, 58 HARV. INT’L L.J. 225, 233 (2017) (noting in the trade regulation context “how
arduous it can be . . . for investigative authorities to determine whether government action was involved
in an apparently innocuous business transaction”); id. at 254 (indicating that the Trans-Pacific
Partnership’s new definition of SOEs addresses this issue by defining SOEs “in terms of state control
or ownership of a quantifiable interest in a corporation”); Shixue Hu, Clash of Identifications: ‘State
Enterprises’ in International Law, 19 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 171, 172 (2019). The FSIA uses the ownership
interest approach to defining SOEs. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
168. See Judith Schönsteiner, Attribution of State Responsibility for Actions or Omissions of State-Owned
Enterprises in Human Rights Matters, 40 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 895, 907 (2019) (noting that, under the ILC
Draft Articles, “the sole criterion on whether there is a link between the company and the State is the
degree of control the latter exercises over the enterprise,” and that the commentary to Draft Article 8
“explicitly excludes that government ownership and the initial establishment of the entity by the State
automatically ensue [sic] state responsibility”); id. at 915 (arguing that “it would be a logical error to
uphold, simultaneously, that a SOE should enjoy state immunity, but not generate state responsibility”).
169. On the interface between domestic and international law on corporate criminal liability, see,
e.g., Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees Seeking Affirmance of District Court’s Decision, Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727
F.3d 174 (2013) (No. 09-2778-CV), 2009 WL 7768332, at *3 (indicating that “[l]egal actions for
violations of the law of nations were not limited to natural persons in the late-eighteenth and earlynineteenth centuries”); cf. Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955, 964-69 (2008) (surveying approaches to holding corporations liable for the
acts of individual officers, managers, and employees); Nadia Bernaz, Corporate Criminal Liability Under
International Law, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 313, 318-21 (2015) (discussing the history of corporate
criminal liability in international criminal law).
170. See Chimène I. Keitner, Categorizing Acts by State Officials: Attribution and Responsibility in the Law
of Foreign Official Immunity, 26 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 451, 461 (2016) (noting that, while domestic
law differentiates between civil responsibility and criminal responsibility, the traditional view of state
responsibility holds that states can owe duties of reparation but cannot owe duties akin to those arising
under municipal criminal law).
171. Id. at 462; see also id. at 463 (noting that, in the final version of the ILC’s Draft Articles,
“[s]tate responsibility continued to elude categorization as either civil or criminal in nature”).
172. The Nuremberg Tribunal famously stated that “crimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract legal entities;” however, national legal systems have increasingly
recognized theories of corporate criminal responsibility under which “a legal entity can be an actor,
with its own mens rea and actus reus.” ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2012).
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controlled by foreign states, can bear civil or criminal responsibility and
incur legal consequences for their acts in certain circumstances.173
Even though it might be difficult to conceive of holding a foreign state
criminally responsible for its conduct under international or domestic law,
the same is not necessarily true of SOEs. As the U.S. government argued in
response to a Lithuanian shipping company’s motion to quash a grand jury
subpoena, the customary international law principle that a foreign state itself
is not generally “subject to punitive measures” does not apply to “separate
corporate entities even if majority owned by the state.”174 Moreover, from a
human rights perspective, Camilla Wee has noted that it could be desirable
to hold SOEs to “a higher standard of human rights observance and
protection.”175 Depending on the circumstances, enforcing such obligations
could provide additional occasions for the exercise of domestic jurisdiction,
including the potential imposition of punitive measures.176
Under the restrictive theory, an entity’s status as a foreign SOE is less
important to determining its potential exemption from domestic jurisdiction
than the nature of the conduct at issue in the proceeding. For example, a
company that is majority-owned by a foreign state is defined as a foreign
state under the FSIA, but it is still subject to suit if the claims fall within an
enumerated exception to immunity.177 Under the U.K. State Immunity Act
of 1978 (SIA), by contrast, the general provisions of the act do not apply
“to any entity . . . which is distinct from the executive organs of the
government of the State and capable of suing or being sued.”178
Consequently, a “distinct” entity can claim jurisdictional immunity from civil
proceedings under the act “if and only if . . . the proceedings relate to
anything done by it in the exercise of sovereign authority” and “the
circumstances are such that a State . . . would have been so immune.”179
As a matter of international law, the fundamental question under the
restrictive theory is whether an entity’s conduct is sovereign or non173. See id. (indicating that “the origins of the international concept of international criminal
responsibility lie in its break with the immunity of state officials”).
174. Government Response to Lithuanian Shipping Company’s Motion to Quash Grand Jury
Subpoena Dated June 10, 2010 at 12, In re Grand Jury Proceeding Related to M/V Deltuva, 752 F.
Supp. 2d 173 (D.P.R. 2010) (No. 10-223); see 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (providing that “a foreign state except
for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages”).
175. CAMILLA WEE, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, REGULATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT
OF STATE-OWNED E NTERPRISES: TENDENCIES OF CORPORATE A CCOUNTABILITY AND STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 16 (2008), https://tinyurl.com/y5z3d25m.
176. Note, however, that this bifurcation could exacerbate a “disjunction between the state as
perpetrator and the SOE as the party held accountable.” Paula Kates, Immunity of State-Owned Enterprises:
Striking a New Balance, 51 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1223, 1234 (2019).
177. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
178. State Immunity Act 1978, c. 33, § 14(1) (UK). The SIA explicitly does not apply to criminal
proceedings. Id. § 16(4).
179. Id. § 14(2).
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sovereign in nature.180 The FSIA additionally asks whether the entity
claiming immunity qualifies as an agency, instrumentality, or organ of a
foreign state.181 SOEs might be treated differently from private enterprises
under domestic substantive or procedural law because of their partial or full
public ownership.182 However, their commercial activities are not exempt
from domestic jurisdiction.
The task of characterizing a SOE’s activity as either commercial or
governmental is not as straightforward as it might at first appear. For
example, Professor Anne van Aaken has noted that, with the rise of
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and return to SOEs in the early twenty-first
century, “the boundaries between state activities and commercial activities
[have] become blurred.”183 She observes that, as a general matter, “the legal
form of sovereign or public authority is the first test to be treated like a state,
[and] the second test is always whether a public function is exercised.”184 As
van Aaken emphasizes, this “opens a Pandora’s box to an even bigger
question, namely what public functions are.”185 This problem is especially
acute with respect to corporate entities associated with planned economies
that do not differentiate clearly between governmental and market activities.
As indicated above, the FSIA defines “commercial activity” to mean
“either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act,” and indicates that the commercial character of an activity
shall be determined by reference to its “nature,” rather than by reference to
its “purpose.”186 If a central goal of the restrictive theory is to put foreign
states on the same footing as private actors when they choose to enter the
marketplace, then the idea of “commercial” activity subject to domestic
180. ANDREW DICKINSON, RAE LINDSAY & AUDLEY SHEPPARD, CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP,
STATE IMMUNITY AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 2 (2008), https://tinyurl.com/y2j9hjbn. This
report notes that international law regarding state immunity from criminal jurisdiction “is less
developed than in relation to civil proceedings.” Id. at 3. In the authors’ view, “a foreign State [itself]
probably enjoys immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of another State’s courts,” and, subject to
specific exceptions, “that immunity also seems capable of protecting the servants and agents (whether
natural or legal persons) of a foreign State with respect to criminal proceedings relating to official acts
performed on behalf of the State.” Id. at 19.
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
182. See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Competition Law and State-Owned Enterprises —
Contribution from the United States, at 2, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2018)55 (Nov. 22, 2018); Victorino J.
Tejera, The U.S. Law Regime of Sovereign Immunity and the Sovereign Wealth Funds, 25 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
1, 15 (2016); David Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors 5 (OECD
Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Working Paper No. 2010/02, 2010), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/
mne/WP-2010_2.pdf.
183. Anne van Aaken, Blurring Boundaries Between Sovereign Acts and Commercial Activities: A Functional
View on Regulatory Immunity and Immunity from Execution 2 (Univ. of St. Gallen L. Sch., Working Paper
No. 2013-17, 2013).
184. Id. at 15.
185. Id. at 15-16.
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
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jurisdiction (in Latin, acta jure gestionis) can be defined negatively as the type
of activity engaged in by actors that are not sovereign states.187
The FSIA puts the authority to determine whether a particular act
counts as “commercial” for the purposes of civil jurisdiction in the hands
of U.S. courts. From a political perspective, however, legislators might view
certain activities as “public functions” when they are performed by U.S.
government agents, and yet seek to subject similar activities by foreign
governments to legal proceedings in the United States.188 For example, the
proposed Homeland and Cyber Threat Act (HACT Act) would have created
an exception to foreign state immunity for any unauthorized access to a
computer located in the United States, regardless of the commercial or
governmental nature of the act.189 It is highly unlikely that the United States
would accede to the jurisdiction of a foreign court for similar alleged
misconduct.
The reciprocity dilemma can also arise in the course of making
judgments about whether to treat a particular entity as an “organ” of the
foreign state for immunity purposes.190 On the one hand, states might act
through distinct legal entities in order to provide themselves with plausible
deniability and attempt to avoid state responsibility. On the other hand,
foreign states—and state-affiliated entities—can seek to invoke state
immunity to shield their acts from scrutiny.191
In the civil context, Congress has by and large entrusted courts with
making these potentially sensitive determinations about the contours of
statutory exceptions to foreign state immunity. In the criminal and
regulatory contexts, by contrast, an Executive Branch agency (such as the
Department of Justice or the Securities and Exchange Commission)
187. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
188. Ongoing attempts to develop internationally accepted substantive rules governing state
conduct in cyberspace routinely confront a version of this reciprocity problem. See, e.g., Chimène I.
Keitner, Foreign Election Interference and International Law, in DEFENDING DEMOCRACIES: COMBATING
FOREIGN ELECTION INTERFERENCE IN A DIGITAL AGE (Jens David Ohlin & Duncan B. Hollis eds.,
2021), and sources cited therein.
189. H.R. 4189, 116th Cong. (2019). Allison Peters and I have argued against amending the FSIA
to permit such lawsuits. Chimène Keitner & Allison Peters, Private Lawsuits Against Nation-States Are
Not the Way to Deal With America’s Cyber Threats, LAWFARE (June 15, 2020),
https://tinyurl.com/y8afxb8c.
190. See Jaemin Lee, State Responsibility and Government-Affiliated Entities in International Economic Law,
49 J. WORLD TRADE 117, 139 (2015) (noting in the context of state responsibility that international
investment tribunals have “put significant emphasis on cultural and/or societal contexts in their state
organ analyses”); see also id. at 140 (noting “the continuing expansion of the governmental functions”).
191. For example, some private entities claim derivative immunity by alleging that they are
exercising governmental functions. See, e.g., Russell Buchan & Daniel Franchini, WhatsApp v. NSO
Group: State Immunity and Cyber Spying, JUSTSECURITY (Apr. 16, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/yytwo9do;
Erik Manukyan, Why Is NSO Group Asserting Sovereign Immunity in WhatsApp Litigation?, LAWFARE (May
22, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/y9qovjc7; Motion of Foreign Sovereign Immunity Scholars for Leave
to File Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, NSO Grp. Techs. Ltd. v. Whatsapp
Inc., No. 20-16408 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2020), 2020 WL 7693729; cf. Lee, supra 190, at 151.
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expresses its views on immunity in the first instance by initiating—or
refraining from initiating—legal proceedings against a foreign state actor or
entity. Interpreting the FSIA to deprive U.S. courts of jurisdiction over
criminal proceedings against such actors and entities, contrary to the intent
of Congress, would deprive the Executive Branch of the ability to make this
type of determination in a variety of contexts, including those described in
Part IV.B below.
Part IV canvasses relevant jurisprudence regarding claims to foreign
sovereign immunity by entities that fall within the FSIA’s definition of
“foreign state” to assess the current doctrinal landscape in this area. Part V
suggests steps that Congress should take to clarify the reach of domestic
criminal jurisdiction over SOEs.

IV.

JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS

The FSIA’s text appears to leave the question of criminal immunity for
foreign states unanswered, as described in Part II. Yet, as Professor Ingrid
Wuerth has observed, and as the cases described above suggest, there is “an
unmistakable trend toward the criminal prosecution of foreign
organizations with ties to foreign governments.”192 Congress should place
the jurisdictional basis for those prosecutions beyond doubt.
This Part begins by telling the story of the “mystery” grand jury
subpoena, which brought this statutory lacuna into the spotlight (Part IV.A).
It then considers the rather sparse case law on the relationship between the
FSIA and criminal proceedings, which until recently had developed
primarily in the context of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) suits (Part IV.B). Finally, it examines cases involving
whether U.S. courts can issue contempt orders against foreign states, and
impose accompanying sanctions (Part IV.C). Combined with the legislative
history of the FSIA canvassed above, this case law counsels strongly against
interpreting the FSIA categorically to preclude the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over foreign states, including SOEs.

A. The Mystery Grand Jury Subpoena Case
On July 11, 2018, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia
issued a subpoena to a company that is wholly owned by a foreign state

192. Wuerth, supra note 19; see also supra Part II.C.
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(referred to as “Country A”).193 The grand jury was convened in conjunction
with an investigation into “foreign interference in the 2016 presidential
election and potential collusion in those efforts by American citizens.”194
The subpoena sought records relevant to the investigation and held by the
company in the United States or abroad.195 The company asserted immunity
“from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts as well as the reach of U.S. subpoenas”
under the FSIA.196 The company also “expressed doubt that any exception
to the FSIA applied” that would permit the exercise of jurisdiction under
the restrictive theory.197
The Special Counsel’s Office (SCO), which was charged with
conducting the investigation, argued in response that the FSIA does not
apply in criminal cases and does not “divest[] the district court of power to
enforce the subpoena.”198 In the SCO’s view, because the FSIA only
governs jurisdiction in civil proceedings, it does not bar criminal
proceedings against a company owned by a foreign state.199 In the
alternative, the SCO argued that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception
allowed the exercise of jurisdiction due to “[REDACTED] activities in the
United States.”200 After failed attempts to negotiate a solution with the SCO,
the company filed a motion to quash the subpoena.201
The motion to quash rested on two grounds: (1) foreign sovereign
immunity, and (2) that compliance would be “unreasonable or oppressive”
because it would require the company to violate foreign law.202 Chief Judge
Beryl Howell denied the motion to quash and imposed civil contempt
193. In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 7409, No. 18-41, 2018 WL 8334867, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 19,
2018). According to the corporation’s brief on appeal to the D.C. Circuit, Country A “wholly owns”
the corporation. Brief for Appellant at 2, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 749 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(No. 18-3071), 2018 WL 8619946.
194. In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 7409, No. 18-41, 2018 WL 8334867, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 19,
2018).
195. Id. at 1-2.
196. Id. at 2 (quoting Movant’s Letter of July 26, 2018).
197. Id. The company’s July 26 letter also questioned whether the district court had personal
jurisdiction. Id. The SCO replied that “[t]he subpoena was served on [REDACTED]” which “is not an
independent entity,” and that “[b]ecause the subpoena was served on [REDACTED], it is immaterial
whether [REDACTED] has access to or visibility into documents in the possession [REDACTED],”
as [REDACTED] itself “unquestionably does have such access and visibility.” Id. at 2 n.2 (quoting
SCO’s Letter of July 30, 2018 at 2). Subsequent correspondence from the company’s counsel did not
reference personal jurisdiction. Id. The company was thus deemed to have waived any objections to
personal (as opposed to subject-matter) jurisdiction. Id.
198. Id. at 3 (quoting SCO’s Letter of July 30, 2018).
199. This has been the long-standing position of the Department of Justice. See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Proceedings Related to M/V Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D.P.R. 2010); United States v.
Hendron, 813 F. Supp. 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
200. In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 7409, No. 18-41, 2018 WL 8334867, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 19,
2018) (quoting SCO’s Letter of July 30, 2018).
201. Id. at 5 (indicating that the company filed a motion to quash on August 16, 2018).
202. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2).
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sanctions for non-compliance, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.203 The identity
of both the company and the country were kept secret, and long remained
unknown.204 Eventually, the company reportedly produced enough
responsive documents to warrant the cessation of monetary contempt
sanctions that had been accruing, at least on paper.205 It now appears that
the investigation was related to a $10 million contribution to the Trump
2016 campaign paid eleven days before the election, which might have
amounted to an illegal foreign campaign contribution.206 SCO investigators
reportedly thought the money might have ties to an Egyptian state-owned
bank, or even to the president of Egypt.207 The probe eventually closed with
no charges filed.208
The crux of the legal dispute was whether the United States could
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state-owned company by compelling
compliance with a grand jury subpoena. The company argued that it was
absolutely immune from any type of criminal proceeding because the FSIA
only provides civil jurisdiction over foreign states in enumerated
circumstances.209 It cited the Supreme Court’s statement in Amerada Hess
that “‘jurisdiction in actions against foreign states is comprehensively treated
by [] section 1330’”210 and cannot be based on the Alien Tort Statute, and
argued that this rationale also forecloses criminal proceedings. The company

203. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 749 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018), 912 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
The Supreme Court subsequently declined a petition for certiorari. 139 S. Ct. 1378 (2019).
204. Grand jury proceedings are conducted in secret (FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(5)), as are ancillary
judicial proceedings “to the extent necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a grand
jury.” In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Lawfare’s Scott Anderson
speculated that the company is likely a foreign state-owned commercial bank. Scott R. Anderson
(@S_R_Anders),
TWITTER
(Dec.
18,
2018,
10:53
PM),
https://twitter.com/S_R_Anders/status/1075237561549930496. The anonymous Twitter account
@TheHoarseWhisperer suggested that it might be the Qatari Investment Authority, which acquired
an almost twenty-percent stake in Russian oil company Rosneft through a somewhat opaque series of
transactions.
(@TheHoarseWhisperer),
TWITTER
(Dec.
18,
2018,
6:55
PM),
https://twitter.com/HoarseWisperer/status/1075177855292792832.
205. Katelyn Polantz, Mystery Company Off the Hook from Mueller Subpoena and Contempt of Court
Charge, CNN (June 7, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y2bfhtvx. On contempt sanctions and sovereign
immunity, see infra Part IV.C.
206. Katelyn Polantz, Evan Perez & Jeremy Herb, Exclusive: Feds Chased Suspected Foreign Link to
Trump’s 2016 Campaign Cash for Three Years, CNN (Oct. 14, 2020), https://tinyurl.com/y3rvrg8o.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Brief for Appellant at 1, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 749 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No.
18-3071), 2018 WL 8619946 (arguing that “when Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) in 1976, it codified the longstanding rule from international law that U.S. courts may not
exercise criminal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign or otherwise subject a foreign sovereign to the
American criminal process”).
210. Id. at 2 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 437 n.5
(1989)) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 14 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613).
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also contended that, under the FSIA, “a jury may play no part in a case
against a foreign state,”211 including by issuing a grand jury subpoena.
The SCO argued in support of the district court’s jurisdiction to compel
compliance with the subpoena. It cited different language from the same
Supreme Court opinion for the proposition that section 1604 of Title 28
“‘work[s] in tandem’ with the Act’s conferral of jurisdiction over ‘civil
action[s] against a foreign state’ (28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)), and should be
understood in that light.”212 In the U.S. government’s view, the FSIA is
“uniform[ly] focus[ed]” on civil actions.213 The result is not that criminal
actions are categorically foreclosed—to the contrary, according to the U.S.
government, the FSIA simply does not affect criminal proceedings one way
or the other.214 To hold otherwise, the SCO argued, would “cast[] aside
decades of practice under which the United States has prosecuted and
served criminal process on commercial enterprises that are majority-owned
by foreign governments.”215
The company ultimately failed to persuade the court of appeals that the
district court “lacked subject-matter jurisdiction” to compel the company to
respond to the subpoena, or to hold the company in civil contempt for noncompliance.216 In affirming the district court’s opinion, the D.C. Circuit—
like the district court—“decline[d] to resolve whether foreign sovereigns are
entitled to claim the protection of the Act’s immunity provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1604, in criminal proceedings.”217 Instead, the panel “assume[d] that
immunity extends to the criminal context,” while finding that the
commercial activity exception to immunity permitted the exercise of
jurisdiction in the circumstances presented.218 Because 28 U.S.C. § 1330 only
confers subject-matter jurisdiction over nonjury civil actions against foreign
states, the court of appeals held that the FSIA left intact the grant of federal

211. Id. at 27.
212. Brief for the United States at 13, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 749 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(No. 18-3071), 2018 WL 8619947 (citing Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434).
213. Id. at 14; see also id. at 13-14 n.5 (noting that the FSIA’s removal provision only covers civil
cases, meaning that the company’s interpretation would lead to the “striking anomaly” that “a state
prosecution against or grand jury proceeding involving a foreign sovereign could not be removed”).
214. Id. at 11 (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 314 (2010) to argue that “the Supreme
Court made clear that the FSIA is comprehensive only ‘if it applies’”).
215. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 18, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 139 S. Ct. 1378
(2019) (No. 18-948), 2019 WL 916761.
216. Brief for Appellant at 6-7, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 749 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No.
18-3071), 2018 WL 8619946 (arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue
an order compelling the company to respond on September 19, and an order holding the company in
civil contempt on October 5).
217. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 749 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
218. Id.
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criminal jurisdiction over “offenses against the laws of the United States” in
18 U.S.C. § 3231.219
The court’s per curiam opinion stated that 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)’s conferral
of subject-matter jurisdiction “over certain nonjury civil actions” does not
“transmute the entirely separate section 1604 [which grants foreign states
immunity from jurisdiction] into a provision about subject-matter
jurisdiction.”220 Instead, “section 1604 tells us that, where the Act applies,
an action must fall within one of the listed exceptions and says nothing
about excluding criminal actions.”221 Thus, in the court’s formulation
(written before the pandemic), section 1604’s grant of immunity “has no
effect on the scope of the underlying jurisdiction [of the federal courts], any
more than a vaccine conferring immunity from a virus affects the biological
properties of the virus itself.”222 In other words, even though section 1604
of Title 28 says that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States and of the States” absent an enumerated
exception,223 this provision does not (in the court’s view) deprive the federal
courts of the criminal jurisdiction provided in Title 18 over actions that fall
within the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions.
Counsel for the United States acknowledged at oral argument on appeal
that applying the FSIA to criminal proceedings is “a little bit of trying to put
a square peg in a round hole.”224 Having looked to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 instead
of 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) for a grant of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court of appeals next turned to whether the district court could assert
personal jurisdiction over the company. Although the district court
“expressly said that any personal jurisdiction issue had been waived,”225 the
court of appeals noted that “for an ordinary subpoena [REDACTED] in
personam jurisdiction is needed.”226 Counsel for the United States
responded by invoking so-called Bank of Nova Scotia subpoenas, which may

219. Id. at 2; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 912 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (rejecting the
company’s argument that the FSIA “eliminated all criminal subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns, taking the contempt power with it”).
220. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 912 F.3d at 627-28.
221. Id. at 629.
222. Id. at 628.
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
224. Oral Argument at 7:15-17, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 912 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No.
18-3071).
225. Id. at 10:22-23.
226. Id. at 8:16-17 (Judge Williams). Judge Williams wondered whether a company operating in
the United States is (still) subject to general personal jurisdiction for purposes of being treated as a
witness after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daimler and Goodyear. Id. at 9:02-03. This is another
question that will need to be resolved sooner rather than later. Unlike the requirement of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived, a defendant can consent to personal jurisdiction.
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be served on a foreign bank that has a branch in the United States.227
Because the company had waived the personal jurisdiction argument, the
court of appeals did not pursue this inquiry.228
In the end, the court of appeals found an applicable exception to
jurisdictional immunity in the third clause of § 1605(a)(2), which applies in
“any case” in which the proceedings are “based upon” an act outside U.S.
territory “in connection with a commercial activity” of the foreign stateowned company elsewhere, and that act causes a “direct effect” in the
United States.229 It held that “a reading [of the FSIA] that embraces absolute
immunity in criminal cases is much harder to reconcile with the Act’s
context and purpose.”230 Under the company’s reading of the statute, “a
foreign-sovereign-owned, purely commercial enterprise operating within
the United States could flagrantly violate criminal laws and the U.S.
government would be powerless to respond save through diplomatic
pressure.”231 The D.C. Circuit rejected this absurd result.
It seems clear that Congress did not intend to eliminate criminal
jurisdiction over foreign-state-owned companies when it enacted the FSIA.
227. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings the Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings the Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Directed to Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Caggiano, supra note 127.
But see In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (subpoena for records of a foreign
company is enforceable only if the company does sufficient business or otherwise has sufficient
contacts with the United States to enable court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it).
228. In another case involving such subpoenas, which was also decided by Chief Judge Beryl
Howell in the first instance, two Chinese banks were held to have consented to U.S. jurisdiction as a
precondition of opening a U.S. branch; in the alternative, the Chief Judge Howell held that the banks
were subject to specific jurisdiction for the purpose of being compelled to produce banking records.
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 381 F. Supp. 3d 37, 51-54 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, In re Sealed Case, 932
F.3d 915, 923 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (upholding exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign banks with
branches in the United States based on consent). In addition, a foreign bank that does not have a U.S.
branch but that maintains a correspondent account at a U.S. bank may be issued an administrative
subpoena under a provision of the Patriot Act. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(k)(3)(A)(i). A third bank in the In
re Grand Jury Investigation case was subject to a subpoena under this provision. See In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 55-59, aff’d, In re Sealed Case, 932 F.3d at 924-25 (upholding exercise of
personal jurisdiction based on bank’s purposeful direction of its relevant activities at the forum).
229. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 912 F.3d 623, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Judge Williams would
instead have found an exception to immunity in the first clause of § 1605(a)(2) on the grounds that the
subpoena is “based upon” the company’s regular course of commercial conduct carried on in the
United States by an American office of the corporation. Id. at 635 (Williams, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Judge Williams criticized the government’s “outdated” argument that the
company’s “‘considerable business’” in the United States subjects the company to general personal
jurisdiction and thus “open[s] all files—wherever they may be—to the prying eyes of U.S. prosecutors.”
Id. However, because the company “raised no objection to the government’s outdated understanding
of what U.S. contacts were necessary to bring a foreign entity (and the documents it possesses) within
the general jurisdiction of our courts,” Judge Williams would have upheld the subpoena based on the
company’s commercial activity in the United States, rather on the “direct effect” in the United States
of the company’s activity overseas. Id. at 636.
230. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 912 F.3d at 629.
231. Id. at 629-30.
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As the D.C. Circuit emphasized, “the relevant reports and hearings suggest
Congress was focused, laser-like, on the headaches born of private plaintiffs’
civil actions against foreign states.”232 It reasoned that, “given how unsettled
the common law of criminal immunities for a corporation owned by a
foreign state was in 1976 and remains today,”233 there is “scant evidence that
Congress sought to resolve such a significant and unsettled issue.”234 Yet,
this explanation also makes it difficult to support applying the FSIA’s
enumerated exceptions in the criminal context without further analysis. The
next two sections describe judicial attempts to determine the contours of
foreign state immunity in criminal proceedings and other forms of
compulsion in U.S. courts, which should inform a future statutory solution.

B. Other Contexts for Asserting Criminal Immunity for SOEs
The case law on foreign state immunity from criminal proceedings
remains relatively sparse. The question of whether the FSIA provides
criminal immunity has arisen several times in the context of suits for civil
damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).235 The statute requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant has
engaged in a pattern of “indictable” acts.236 Some RICO defendants have
argued that this means the particular defendant must be subject to criminal
prosecution for the predicate acts. If this is true, then civil RICO claims can
only proceed against defendants who are not immune from criminal
prosecution.
There is a circuit split on this question, which has become less pressing
since the Supreme Court curtailed the geographic reach of civil RICO.237
The Tenth Circuit found that the FSIA provides jurisdiction over civil
RICO claims against the Republic of Nigeria and its central bank.238 The
court read the FSIA’s silence about criminal proceedings to mean that
criminal proceedings, and thus a defendant’s “indictab[ility],” fall outside the
scope of the statute. In the Tenth Circuit’s view, “[i]f Congress intended
defendants such as CBN and RN to be immune from criminal indictment

232. Id. at 630.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Brian Rosner, Natalie A. Napierala & Michael D. Sloan, The Sound of Silence: Criminal
Immunity for Foreign Sovereigns Under the FSIA, and Civil RICO Liability for Foreign Sovereigns in the Second
Circuit, LAW.COM (Oct. 3, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/yxvmgp9t.
236. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), 1962(a), 1964(c).
237. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016) (applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality to RICO’s civil cause of action).
238. Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 198 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 1999).
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under the FSIA, Congress should amend the FSIA to expressly so state.”239
The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in a case that also
involved the Central Bank of Nigeria.240 It interpreted the FSIA’s silence on
criminal jurisdiction to mean that there is no exception for criminal
proceedings in the FSIA, and thus that the predicate acts would not be
“indictable.” The U.S. government has endorsed the Tenth Circuit’s
reasoning.241
The question of criminal immunity also arose in the context of an earlier
grand jury subpoena. In In re Grand Jury Proceeding Related to M/V Deltuva, the
Puerto Rico district court denied Lithuanian Shipping Company’s (LSC)
motion to quash the subpoena.242 The United States argued that LSC, which
is majority-owned by the government of Lithuania, was not entitled to
immunity because it was engaged in commercial service, and because the
FSIA does not apply to criminal investigations or actions.243 The United
States took the position that “although the FSIA is inapplicable to criminal
proceedings, it supports a finding that commercial instrumentalities of
foreign governments, such [as] LSC, are not immune from punitive
measures based on their commercial activities in the United States.”244
According to the record, LSC was formed “for the express purpose of
enabling the Republic of Lithuania to own and manage ocean going cargo
vessels,”245 and the M/V Deltuva—which was owned and managed by
LSC—was tasked with “further[ing] official Lithuanian state economic
policies and purposes.”246 While the M/V Deltuva was docked in San Juan,
Puerto Rico, personnel from the U.S. Coast Guard performed a Port State
Control inspection and discovered “evidence indicating that the crew of the
vessel had engaged in the illegal dumping of oil at sea and concomitant
falsification of on-board log books to camouflage evidence of an alleged oil
spill.”247 At the time, the vessel was not engaged in official government
239. Id. at 1215. Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment based on the
argument that the plaintiffs’ claims did not fall within commercial activity exception, and that the court
therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court granted summary judgment, and the
Tenth Circuit affirmed. Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 328 F.3d 1267, 1274 (10th Cir. 2003)
(finding that “the perpetrators of the fraud were neither agents nor employees of the Nigerian
government”).
240. Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that “the FSIA
does not provide an exception for criminal jurisdiction”).
241. Government Response to Lithuanian Shipping Company’s Motion to Quash Grand Jury
Subpoena Dated June 10, 2010 at 9-10, In re Grand Jury Proceeding Related to M/V Deltuva, 752 F.
Supp. 2d 173 (D.P.R. 2010) (No. 10–223).
242. In re Grand Jury Proceeding Related to M/V Deltuva, 752 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D.P.R. 2010).
243. Id. at 174.
244. Id. at 175.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 175-76.
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activities, but it was carrying a commercial cargo to the United States.248 The
district court narrowed its inquiry to “whether principles of sovereign
immunity as enunciated by the FSIA shield LSC, an instrumentality of the
Republic of Lithuania, from the Court’s exercise of criminal subject-matter
jurisdiction [under 18 U.S.C. § 3231] in the instant case.”249
The district court began by asking whether LSC could assert a
“‘constitutional, common-law or statutory privilege’” insulating it from the
obligation to produce the materials requested in the subpoena.250 It found
that LSC could not assert a statutory privilege under the FSIA, because there
is “no indication that Congress intended for the FSIA to govern criminal
proceedings against agencies or instrumentalities of foreign
governments.”251 Interestingly, the court did not go on to examine whether
there was an applicable common-law protection, concluding simply that
there was “no constitutional, statutory or common-law grounds for
quashing the grand jury subpoena.”252 A lack of statutory immunity does
not necessarily mean no immunity; rather, it means that any such immunity
must be grounded in a different source of law, as explored in Part V below.

C. Holding Foreign States in Contempt
Some cases have also raised the question whether monetary contempt
sanctions are available against foreign states. Lower courts have disagreed,
with the D.C. Circuit upholding an order for contempt sanctions, and the
Fifth Circuit vacating one as incompatible with the FSIA.253 In those cases,
unlike in the Mueller grand jury subpoena case, the United States opposed
the imposition of civil contempt sanctions on foreign states.254
The D.C. Circuit’s decision involved civil contempt sanctions against
the Democratic Republic of Congo for failing to respond to court-ordered
248. Id. at 176.
249. Id. at 177. It appears that the Lithuanian Ministry of Transportation sent a diplomatic note
to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security requesting that DHS “facilitate the release of the vessel,”
but DHS “chose not to act upon this note.” Id. at 176. There is no indication that Lithuania approached
the Department of State about a potential claim of immunity.
250. Id. at 177 (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)).
251. Id. at 179-80. The court also noted that, even if the FSIA did apply, the commercial activity
exception would “likely” grant the court subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. Id. at 180 n.3.
252. Id. at 180.
253. Compare FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 637 F.3d 373 (D.C.
Cir. 2011), with Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006).
254. E.g., Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Chabad v. Russian Federation, No. 1:05cv-01548-RCL, 2015 WL 9244220 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2015). State Department Deputy Legal Adviser
Elizabeth Verville testified in 1987 regarding the FSIA that “[t]he legislative history of the Act properly
suggests, we believe, that imposition of a fine on a foreign state or incarceration of its officials for a
state’s failure to comply with a court order would not be permitted.” FSIA Hearing, supra note 63, at 21
(statement of Elizabeth G. Verville, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State).

264

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 61:2

discovery.255 The question was whether the court could impose contempt
sanctions in the first place, not whether the court could enforce them against
a foreign state’s assets. The court of appeals reasoned that “whether the
court can enforce its contempt sanction is irrelevant to the availability of a
contempt order,”256 and that “there is not a smidgen of indication in the text
of the FSIA that Congress intended to limit a federal court’s inherent
contempt power.”257 The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, found that the apparent
non-enforceability of contempt sanctions under the FSIA’s provisions on
attachment and execution precluded the court from ordering such sanctions
to begin with.258
In the mystery subpoena case, the U.S. government requested contempt
sanctions of $10,000 per day against the recalcitrant defendant.259 The
district court imposed a higher penalty of $50,000 per day in light of “the
government’s need for prosecutorial expedience in a matter of great concern
in the United States” and “‘the character and magnitude of the harm
threatened by continued contumacy.’”260 However, the court delayed
accrual of the sanctions pending resolution of the appeal.261 The D.C.
Circuit relied on its own precedent to uphold the imposition of sanctions
and bracketed the question of execution for future resolution.262
Under the FSIA, a separate legal regime governs the immunity of
foreign state assets from execution to satisfy monetary judgments, including
any accrued monetary sanctions.263 Over time, these amounts can become
substantial.264 As the D.C. Circuit has noted, however, “[t]he FSIA is a rather
unusual statute that explicitly contemplates that a court may have
jurisdiction over an action against a foreign state and yet be unable to
enforce its judgment unless the foreign state holds certain kinds of property
subject to execution.”265 In addition, the FSIA explicitly precludes most
255. FG Hemisphere Assocs., 637 F.3d at 375; see also id. at 377 (characterizing the U.S. government’s
opposition to sanctions as “quite confusing, conflating a contempt order imposing monetary sanctions
with an order enforcing such an award through execution”).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 378.
258. Af-Cap, Inc., 462 F.3d at 428; see also id. at 429 (noting that “[u]nder the FSIA, a court’s power
to make an order does not always entail a power of enforcement by sanctions”).
259. In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 7409, No. 18-41, 2018 WL 8334866, at *3 n.1 (D.D.C. Oct.
5, 2018).
260. Id. (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947)).
261. Id. at *3.
262. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 912 F.3d 623, 633 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
263. 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
264. See, e.g., Graham Bowley, Russia Fined $44 Million for Refusing to Hand Over Jewish Books, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/yy7fdrhk (reporting a monetary judgment of $43.7 million
against Russia).
265. FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 377 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
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punitive damages awards in civil suits against foreign states, but not against
SOEs.266 The issue of contempt sanctions is also one that Congress can and
should address explicitly. In so doing, it should distinguish among the civil,
criminal, and regulatory contexts, and it should more explicitly define the
Executive Branch’s role in providing input to courts about whether
contempt sanctions are or are not appropriate in a particular case.

V.

APPLYING THE COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN CRIMINAL
IMMUNITY

If the FSIA does not preclude criminal proceedings against foreign
states and their agencies or instrumentalities, then courts will need to
determine how to make decisions regarding the scope of immunity for these
entities. As in the case of foreign official immunity, they will need to apply
a federal common law of foreign state immunity in the criminal context.267
This is easier said than done.
Available sources for crafting this body of federal common law include
customary international law, Executive Branch interpretations, prior judicial
practice, and relevant analogous statutes. Absent further guidance from
Congress, the baseline for foreign state immunity determinations should be
the restrictive theory. This means that, at a minimum, an entity’s commercial
acts are presumptively subject to jurisdiction, limited by applicable domestic
constraints (such as due process). Courts could take the position, as they
have in criminal prosecutions of natural persons, that the initiation of
criminal proceedings itself constitutes a determination by the Executive
Branch that a defendant, target, or witness is not entitled to immunity. This
approach would echo the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in upholding the
denial of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega’s claim to immunity from
criminal jurisdiction: that “by pursuing Noriega’s capture and this
prosecution, the Executive Branch has manifested its clear sentiment that
Noriega should be denied head-of-state immunity.”268 If the answer to the
immunity question turns on criteria that the judiciary is competent to
ascertain—such as whether the entity’s conduct is properly viewed as
266. 28 U.S.C. § 1606. But cf. Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601 (2020) (upholding award
of punitive damages under the FSIA’s amended exception to immunity for state sponsors of terrorism).
267. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations, 106 GEO .
L.J. 1825, 1848 (2018) (“Common law thus governs when an individual who is sued may be entitled to
immunity based on her status . . . or based on her conduct.”). This Article cannot do justice to ongoing
debates about the existence and operation of federal common law generally. The persistence of these
debates highlights the need for a coherent statutory solution.
268. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (also indicating that Noriega,
who “never served as the constitutional leader of Panama,” would “likely” not qualify for head-of-state
immunity “even if this court had to make an independent determination regarding the propriety of
immunity in this case”); see also supra note 102 and sources cited therein.
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commercial rather than governmental—then the court could accord
significant weight to the Executive Branch’s views, while also considering
relevant domestic judicial practice and applicable norms of customary
international law.
Alternatively, courts could take the extreme position—contrary to the
likely intent of Congress and the long-standing view of the Executive
Branch—that federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
criminal proceedings against any entity that the FSIA defines as a “foreign
state,” including foreign-state-owned corporations and other legal persons.
They could base this position on the FSIA drafters’ decision to include
foreign-state-owned corporations within the definition of a “foreign state”
while omitting any explicit statutory restoration of the criminal jurisdiction
purportedly withheld under the sweeping language of 28 U.S.C. §1604.
Among other problems, this approach would have the paradoxical result of
creating a regime of absolute immunity from criminal proceedings, which
are initiated by the Executive Branch, alongside restrictive immunity from
civil proceedings, which are initiated primarily by private parties. This would
not effectuate the overall purpose of the statute, which was to place foreign
states and state-owned entities on the same footing as private players in the
marketplace.
As indicated above, the D.C. Circuit cobbled together the hybrid
position that 18 U.S.C. § 3231 confers subject-matter jurisdiction on federal
courts over any type of defendant in criminal proceedings, but that foreign
states (as defined in the FSIA) are entitled to immunity from such
proceedings unless one of the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions applies.269
This approach grafts provisions of a civil statute onto a grant of criminal
jurisdiction, and presumes that the exceptions to immunity from civil and
criminal proceedings are congruent. One can justifiably question the
doctrinal soundness of this novel approach.
The D.C. Circuit’s approach might seem practically appealing (if
doctrinally unsatisfying), but it creates more problems than it solves.
Criminal and regulatory proceedings have a fundamentally different purpose
from civil litigation. As described in Part II.C, the Department of Justice has
indicted foreign state agents and entities in circumstances that would not
necessarily fall under the commercial activities exception to the FSIA, such
as interfering in the U.S. electoral process. The expressive value of criminal
prosecutions, and the ability of the United States to use such measures as
retorsions or even countermeasures in its relations with foreign states, might
argue in favor of a more permissive approach to jurisdiction. On the other
hand, the United States might wish to limit its own reciprocal exposure to
punitive measures in foreign courts, for the same reason that the FSIA
269. See supra Part II.B.
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exempts foreign states (but not their agencies or instrumentalities) from
punitive damages in most circumstances. The “hybrid” approach of cuttingand-pasting the contours of FSIA immunity and its exceptions directly into
Title 18 does not account for these different considerations.
Among imperfect options, a federal common-law approach seems the
most doctrinally and practically tenable pending further legislation. As a
doctrinal matter, given that the drafters of the FSIA were focused on
providing long-arm jurisdiction over certain suits initiated by private parties,
the Supreme Court would likely find that the FSIA simply does not apply in
criminal cases, just as it does not apply to foreign officials. Congress enacted
the FSIA to replace the Tate Letter regime with respect to privately-initiated
suits against foreign states. Consequently, the common law of foreign state
immunity continues to govern criminal proceedings against SOEs, just as
the common law of foreign official immunity governs proceedings against
natural persons who do not fall within the scope of a specialized statute.
Adopting a common-law approach involves the difficult task identifying
the sources, and content, of the federal common law of foreign state
immunity from criminal proceedings. As a practical matter, courts should
begin with the jurisdictional grant in 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and a presumption
that the government agency that initiated proceedings has made a casespecific determination that there are no applicable immunities. As with
criminal proceedings against foreign officials, this presumption should not
lightly be disturbed. At the end of the day, however, the Executive Branch’s
determinations are fundamentally political in nature, since they involve
weighing the value of pursuing domestic proceedings against their potential
impact on foreign relations.270 This is precisely the type of determination
that the FSIA sought to eliminate in the civil context. The gate-keeping
function of the Executive Branch in initiating criminal proceedings means
that such proceedings can never be completely apolitical. That said, the
more transparent and predictable the standards applied by prosecutorial
authorities and by courts, the more likely they are to help shape foreign
states’ behavior ex ante, rather than simply punishing misdeeds ex post.
Absent further guidance from Congress, including in the form of a
statutory provision that explicitly allow certain types of criminal proceedings
against entities owned or controlled by foreign states, courts should proceed
on the understanding that foreign states themselves are not generally subject
270. As the Supreme Court noted in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.: “the very
nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly
confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government . . . They are decisions of
a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been held
to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.” 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948).
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to domestic criminal jurisdiction (even for their commercial activities),
especially since the Executive Branch has not claimed otherwise. By
contrast, separate entities such as SOEs and other agents of foreign states
are subject to domestic criminal jurisdiction, at a minimum, for their
commercial activities under the restrictive theory, and perhaps for other acts
that violate U.S. criminal law.271
Other countries’ approaches can also be instructive. Although the
United States views jurisdictional immunities as a matter of “grace and
comity,”272 their partial codification in the FSIA was part of a broader
international trend towards implementing the restrictive theory of immunity
as a matter of international law.273 State immunity statutes in other common
law jurisdictions generally make clear that they do not govern immunity
from criminal proceedings, but this does not mean that such proceedings
are foreclosed under domestic law, depending on the status of the alleged
wrongdoer and the nature of the alleged misconduct.274
As indicated above, although foreign states themselves have not
generally been deemed capable of incurring criminal responsibility under
domestic law, the same is not true of other legal persons, such as
corporations.275 As the United States indicated in its brief opposing
certiorari in the mystery subpoena case, “many of those [other state
immunity acts] make clear that government-owned corporations are
generally not treated as the state for purposes of immunity, except where
the corporation is engaging in the ‘exercise of sovereign authority.’”276 The
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations also indicates that “[t]he FSIA
provides a broader definition of ‘foreign state’ than is typical under foreign
and international practice, by including agencies and instrumentalities for
most purposes,” but that “U.S. law affords somewhat less protection to
agencies and instrumentalities than to the foreign state itself.”277 Although
the FSIA defines “foreign state” expansively for purposes of that statute,
history and practice support differentiating between state-owned
corporations and foreign states for immunity purposes under a common law
271. Other questions, such as the potential exercise of criminal jurisdiction by state courts, would
also need to be addressed. Depending on the facts of a particular case, the act of state doctrine might
have a role to play, although only if a particular proceeding sought to invalidate the act of a foreign
government performed on its own territory. See generally John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine,
47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 507 (2016); Chimène I. Keitner, Adjudicating Acts of State, in FOREIGN A FFAIRS
LITIGATION IN U NITED STATES COURTS 49 (John Norton Moore ed., 2013).
272. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part II.B.
274. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part II.C.
276. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 17, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 139 S. Ct. 1378
(2019) (No. 18-948), 2019 WL 916761.
277. FOURTH RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 452 reporters’ note 12.
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approach.278 Applying the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions uncritically in the
criminal context does not permit such differentiation, unless one uses the
availability of punitive damages in civil proceedings under the FSIA as a
proxy for susceptibility to criminal proceedings under Title 18.
In sum, the interaction between evolving notions of corporate criminal
responsibility in domestic law and state responsibility in international law
suggests the need for more explicitly tailored immunity doctrines to
circumscribe the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by U.S. courts. The default
position should be that foreign state-owned companies are subject to U.S.
criminal jurisdiction, at least with respect to their commercial activities.
More difficult questions will arise in investigations and prosecutions
involving non-commercial conduct that a critical mass of other countries
would view as entitled to jurisdictional immunity, and for which the United
States might wish to assert immunity on behalf of its agencies or
instrumentalities if the roles were reversed.
Inviting Congress to modify the FSIA in the current political climate
could be a risky proposition.279 Nevertheless, there are several actions
Congress could take in addition to clarifying that the FSIA does not confer
blanket immunity on foreign state-owned entities from actions that are not
civil in nature. First, Congress could further subdivide the definition of
“foreign state” in § 1603(b)(2) to differentiate more clearly between
“organs” of a foreign state, on the one hand, and state-owned enterprises,
on the other. It could also remove state-owned enterprises from the scope
of § 1603 altogether. If it chose this route, it could insert supplemental
language elsewhere in Title 28 to ensure that the long-arm provisions
codified as part of the FSIA continue to apply to SOEs, and that SOEs can
invoke immunity defenses where appropriate if they are engaged in the
exercise of sovereign authority. Second, Congress could draft a statutory
framework for criminal and regulatory proceedings against foreign stateowned agencies and instrumentalities that takes into account the strong U.S.
interest in being able to investigate and prosecute a range of activity with
harmful effects in the United States, consistent with any applicable
constitutional limits. Third, Congress could make clear that criminal or
regulatory proceedings can only be initiated by the Department of Justice,
and not by any individual state’s Attorney General. Fourth, it could clarify
the service and personal jurisdiction provisions that apply to foreign stateowned companies in the criminal context, including by endorsing the use of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.
278. See supra Part III.A.
279. See, e.g., supra notes 18, 189 (counseling against amending the FSIA to create broad exceptions
for pandemics and unauthorized cyber activity, respectively).
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Finally, Congress should explicitly encourage the Department of Justice
to coordinate more closely with the Department of State when it brings
criminal actions against individuals or entities that are closely tied to foreign
states.280 Beyond mere encouragement, Congress could design reporting
requirements for the initiation and conduct of criminal proceedings that
arguably fall within a grey zone of non-governmental activity under the
restrictive theory. This would enable Congress to better perform its
oversight and coordination functions in an area situated at the intersection
of economic policy, foreign relations, national security, and law
enforcement.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Like Chief Justice John Marshall’s 1812 opinion in Schooner Exchange,
contemporary U.S. practice regarding foreign state immunities both draws
on, and shapes, customary international law. The FSIA has generally served
the U.S. interest in de-politicizing immunity determinations, but it left
important issues unaddressed that Congress should now clarify. Most
importantly, Congress—and, pending new legislation, the courts—should
leave no doubt that the FSIA does not deprive U.S. courts of the ability to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over defendants, subpoena targets, or
witnesses that are owned by foreign states.

280. This proposal is consistent with a similar suggestion made by Steven Koh, although it is fair
to say that the benefits of further coordination also come with additional bureaucratic costs. Given the
high-stakes foreign relations concerns that these cases may implicate, this seems like a worthwhile
trade-off, especially if the National Security Council, supported by members of the interagency
Lawyer’s Group, takes a proactive role in vetting such actions and providing timely guidance to relevant
decision-makers. See Steven Arrigg Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 340, 391 (2019).
For an example of the problems that can arise absent sufficient (apparent) coordination, see Chimène
Keitner, Trump, Huawei, and the Politics of Extradition: Making Sense of the Meng Case, FOREIGN A FFAIRS
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/y3jothkk; see also Steven Arrigg Koh, The Huawei Arrest: How It
Likely Happened and What Comes Next, JUSTSECURITY (Dec. 10, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/ybqean6y.

